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ABSTRACT: Review of the evidence confirms the choice of Novem-
ber1973 and March 1975 as the most recent business cycle peak and
trough dates, respectively. A period of slow growth, dated from
March1973, preceded the recession. By most measures the recession was
the most serious since 1937, but the decline in employment was brief and
moderate. One implication is that loss of jobs has become a smaller factor
than formerly in pushing up unemployment during recession. Another is
that the growth of the cyclically stable service industries may well contin-
ue to reduce the overall severity of recessions. ~ The recovery that
began in 1975 was of about average strength during its first two years in
terms of output, employment, real income, and retail sales but weak in
capital investment. The inflation rate, which rose to unusually high levels
during the 1970-1973 expansion and most of the ensuing recession,
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dropped sharply thereafter and continued to of'clinp during the first year
or so of recovery. Although the decline during the recovery was unusually
large, it was not altogether out of line with the historical relationship be-
tween rates of recovery in output and concurrent changes in the inflation
rate.
(1] INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This paper has two main objectives. The first is to present an analytical account
of the major fluctuations in selected economic indicators and their timing in
the recent business cycle recession and recovery in the United States. The sec-
ond is to measure the severity of the recession and the vigor of the recovery,
especially by comparing the 1973-1976 movements with earlier contractions
and expansions.
In a recent NBER study (Moore 1975), teiltative answers were given to the
questions, When did the u.s. business expansion of the early 1970s begin to
510w down? When did it end? In the first part of this report, we examine some
new and revised data bearing on these questions and reconsider the answers
in the light of this evidence. We also identify the most recent upturns in the se-
lected indicators and use the information to date the business revival of
1975-1976.
In the second part of the report, measures of duration, depth, and diffusion
of recessions are analyzed so as to place the most recent business recession in
the United States in historical perspective. Patterns of recessions and recov-
eries during the last fifty years also are systematically compared. Throughout
the paper, we concentrate attention upon the comprehensive time series on
income and expenditures, value of output and sales, volume of production,
employment and unemployment. These data were recently used to review
and revise the NBER reference chronology of business cyeie peaks and troughs
during 1948-1970 as well as the growth cycle chronology of downturns and
upturns (Zarnowilz and Boschan, 1975a, 1977). In addition, we examine many
other important economic indicators in the areas of prices. trade, investment in
plant and equipment, inventories, profits, money, credit, and interest rates.
Although several reports on the performance of the economy, policies, and
expectations at various times during the 1973-1976 period have already ap-
peared,l we may still be too close to those events to reach a deeper under-
standing of them. Still, any account of what happened should be guided by
some notions about the proximate source of the observed changes. We there-
fore refer to several explanatory hypotheses with which our findings are (or are
not) consistent, but we do not undertake to study the success or failure of eco-
nomic policy during the period.Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 473
Summary of Findings
1. The peak in business activity preceding the recession of 1973-1975
came in November 1973. The trough marking the end of the recession came in
March 1975. Thus the twenty-eighth recession in the National Bureau's busi-
ness cycle chronology, which begins in 1854, lasted sixteen months. It was
longer than any of the five preceding recessions during 1948-1970, of which
the longest lasted eleven months. But during the first ten months, i.e., until
September1974, total output declined only moderately and total employment
did not decline at all. Hence the most serious part of the recession was
relatively brief, about six months.
The recession was preceded by a phase of slower growth, starting in
March 1973. The upturn two years later brought with it rapid growth. Hence
the slow-growth phase encompassing the recession lasted twenty-four
months, which also was longer than any of the five preceding phases of slow
growth associated with recession.
Through the end of 1976, when our analysis stops, the recovery had lasted
21 months. Business cycle expansions since 1948 have averaged 50 months, or
36 months if one excludes the exceptionally long expansion of 1961-1969.
Periods of rapid growth, however, have been shorter, averaging 20 months,
with a range of from 8 to 30 months. In general, periods of rapid and slow
growth have been more nearly equal in duration than periods of expansion and
contraction.
2. In terms of the overall decline in output and the rise in unemployment,
the 1973-1975 recession was more severe than any of the five earlier reces-
sions of the post-World War" period. But in terms of the reduction in employ-
ment, it was relatively moderate. One of the principal reasons for this anomaly
is that the growth of the service industries, which are less affected by reces-
sion, offsets the decline in the goods-producing industries to a larger extent
with respect to employment than with respect to output. Another factor is
that the loss of jobs during recession in recent times has become a smaller
source of unemployment than the increase in the labor force. As il result of
these trends, employment has become more stable, relative both to output
and to unemployment.
3. The continued rise in inflation rates, which hit double-digit levels in
mid-'1974, long after the recession began, stands in sharp contrast to the pat-
terns of price behavior in earlier business cycle contractions during which the
rate of inflation promptly diminished or, as in 1949 and the 19305, deflation oc-
curred. Probably more than in most business cycles of the past, the 1973-1974
slowdown-and-recession sequence was influenced by cost increases affecting
food, fuel, and raw materials, and by supply restrictions, which tend to produce
rising prices along with falling output. Unit labor costs and interest rates also
rose more rapidly at a late stage of the recession than has been customary.TABLE 1 Chronology of Peaks and Troughs in Nineteen Selected Indicators of Aggregate
Economic Activity, Levels and Deviations from Trend, 1973-1975
Peak in Peak in Trough in Trough in
Deviation Series Series Deviation
from Trendb• Properc Proper' from Trend
b
Line Series" (1) (2) (3) (4)
In Physical Units or Constant Dollars
Retail sales in constant dollars (59) March 1973 March 1973 Nov. 1974 Nov. 1974
2 Final sales in constant dollars, Q (213) Feb. 1973 Aug. 1973 Feb. 1975 Feb.1975
3 Cross national product (GNP) in constant dol-
lars, Q (50i Feb. 1973 Nov. 1973 Feb. 1975 Feb. 1975
4 Mfg. and trade sales in constant dollars (57) Feb.1973 Nov.1973 March 1975 March 1975
5 Personal income in constant dollars (52) March 1973 Sept. 1973 March 1975 April 1975
6 Index of industrial production (47) Sept. 1973 june1974 March 1975 March 1975
7 No. of unemployed, inverted, h.s. (37) Oct. 1973 Oct. 1973 May 1975 May 1975
8 Unemployment rate. total, inverted (43) Oct. 1973
d d d May 1975d
9 Total civilian employment, h.s. (442) Oct. 1973 July 1974 March 1975 March 1975
10 Persons engaged in nonag. activities, h.s. (42) Oct. 1973 July 1974 March 1975 March 1975
11 Nonfarm employment, establishment survey
(41 ) Nov. 1973 Sept. 1974 June1975 June1975
12 Employee-hours in nonag. establishments 148) Nov. 1973 Oct. 1974 June1975 June 1975
In Current Dollars
13 Sales of retail stores (54) March 1973 n.t. n.t. 1\ov.1974
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n,t. .... no specific cycle turn.
NOTE: For quarterly series. the turning points .u" identified by the middle month of the quarter.
aSenes are listed roughly according to the timing ot the turning pOints shown to the right. from the ('arliest to the latest. Q denote, quarterly series; h.s.. housphold survey. Sen<'>$ numbf'rs
b~~:~~~:~~~~:~~~~;~o::~~~t~~~~~~:'~d growth cycle upturn (troughs)
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dSince the trend In the labor force is impliCitly allowed for in computing the unemployment rate. it IS used herp without furth"r trend adjustmpnt.476 Victor Zarnowitz and Geoffrey H. Moore
Weaknesses on the demand sid£', which contribute to output reductions amI
often counteract price rises, developed early in certain sectors of the econo-
my-notably construction-and later became increasingly apparent. The
declines in the rate of inflation, in labor costs and in interest rates, when they
finally did come, were unusually large by historical standards.
4. The recovery through 1976 was moderately strong-just a little short oj
the average of recent recoveries. In past recoveries, back as far as 1921, high
rates of growth in output during the first year and a half or so have been ac-
companied by substantial increases in the rate of inflation, while recoveries
with low rates of growth have been characterized by modest increases or re-
ductions in the rate of inflation. The continued decline in the rate of inflation
during the first year of the 1975-1976 recovery was more or less in line with
this historical relationship.
5. The distinctive features of recent de\/elopments derive largely from the
impact of rampant inflation and fuel and materials shortages in 1973-1974,
and later from continuing fears of a recurrence of such phenomena and the
consequent caution in the behavior of economic decision makers. The external
and unexpected changes in relative prices and the inflation rate made econom-
ic measurements particularly difficult and, at least on a current basis, frequently
unreliable and sometimes misleading. But the basic economic motivations per-
sisted, and in the end, they account for the reappearance in this episode of
many familiar cyclical reactions such as thf' sharp decline and rise of inventory
investment in 1974-1975.
[2] ECONOMIC CHARACTER AND TIMING OF THE 1973-1976
SLOWDOWN, RECESSION, AND RECOVERY
Measures of aggregate output. income, sales, and employment provide a com-
posite profile of "business cycles" defined as fluctuations in overall economic
activity. As a group, their cyclical peaks ordinarily coincide with each other ap-
proximately, and so do their troughs. Hence they can be used to identify the
peaks and troughs of general business expansions and contractions. The set
used here (Table 1) consists of twelve series in real terms and seven irJ current
dollars. The latter are used in addition to the former partly because aggregates
in current dollars represent the o(lginal form in which many economic transac-
tions take place a!1d are motivated. We use them also because adjustments for
changes in the price level. particularly during 1973-1976, are subject to con-
siderable margins of error. But in the dating of business cycles, wherever there
are substantial differences in the timing of current dollar and physical volume
series because of inflation, we have given decisive weight to the latter, as rep-CHART 1 Selected Mealure, of Aggregate Lcollomic Activity, 1~72 19·,6
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resenting more closely what is commonly understood by recession and recov-
ery. Moreover, since aspects of general economic activity admit of different
measurements and their alternative statistical representations contain largely
unknown data errors, we do not hesitate to consider the evidence from two or
more related or partly overlapping series for some of the processes covered.
478CHART 1 (concluded)
B. Indil.1tor ... in Curr.::nt Dolt.lh
(Nov.)
P
The dates of the critical turning points in the nineteen series in the recent
recession-and-recovery period refer to the series proper (Chart 1) and devia-
tions of the series from their long-run trends (Chart 2) from 1972 through
1976.
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The 1973 Slowdown
The expansion that began toward the close of 1970 was very brisk initially. re-
bounding from the General Motors strike. It moderated briefly in the first half
of 1971, and then resumed rapid growth, which extended into the first quarter
of 1973. Aperiod of slow but positive growth followed in the next three quar-
ters, approximately through November 1973.
The chronology of peaks in deviations from trend of the nineteen selected
indicators, which is presented in Table 1, column 1, shows when the slow-
down of 1973 began and how it spread. These dates identify the peaks in time
series obtained by dividing the successive observations for each indicator by
the corresponding trend values, where the trend is measured in such a way as
to cut through the short-run cyclical movements in the series. 2 The detrended
series themselves are shown in Chart 2. Declines in the trend-adjusted series
represent periods of slowdown in the sense that the series was either rising less
rapidly than its trend rate of growth or actually declining.
The sharpest early.decline occurred in the constant-dollar sales of retail
stores, for which March 1973 denotes the peak in both the level and the devia-
tion from trend. Retail sales in current dollars continued to move up but evi-
dently only because the effects of price rises outweighed those of quantity
decline; the growth rates even for this series fell off substantially, and the devi-
ations from trend also turned down early. In February 1973, too, total manufac-
turing and trade sales in constant dollars shifted from a high-growth to a low-
growth phase, though the nonretail components held LIp sufficiently well to
delay the peak in this comprehensive series until November. Personal income
in constant dollars, after allowing for trend, declined after March 1973. Further-
more, the first quarter of 1973 witnessed peaks in deviations from trend in
three major quarterly indicators: GNP and final sales (GNP minus inventory
change), both in 1972 dollars, and the GNP "gap" (potential less actual GNP,
invertedl. The data in Table 2, which contains a selection of quarterly measures
of the economy's performance, confirm the occurrence of a widespread slow-
down between the first and fourth quarters of 1973 (see in particular line 3and
note also that unemployment-line21-stopped declining after the first
quarter).3
Although personal income grew little when measured in constantdollars, its
rise was substantial when measured in current dollars, and these nominal in-
creases were su bject to the progressivity of the income tax system. As inflation
pushed up the effective tax rates, it worked to reduce any further gains in real
disposable (after-tax) income. The weakening of disposable income after ad-
justments for inflation would be expected to adversely affect real consumer
expenditure, and hence also real retail sales. Accepted consumption theory
and prior empirical evidence.indicate that this relationship is a powerful one,
though with significant lags and slippages in the short run. On this occasion,
real consumption and sales reacted unusually promptly and strongly, probablyTABLE 2 levels, Deviations from Trend, Relative Changes, and




First Second Third Fourth First Second Third fourth
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
nl (2) (3) 14) (5) (6) (7) (8)
line
GrosS Nation.ll Product (GNP) in Current
GNP, bi!. current dollars, ann. rate 1,265.3 1,288.4 1.3175 l.355.1 1,372.7 l.399.4 1,431.6 1.4492
1
15.9 7.5 9.3 11.9 5.3 11.0 9.5 5.0
2 Percent change, ann. rate
102.1 1020 1023 101.4
3 Percent of trenda 102.1 101.8 102.1 102.9
4 GNP, bi!. constant (19721 dollars,
1,230.4 1,220.8 1,212.9 1,1917
ann. rate 1,229.8 1,231.1 1,236.3 1.2426
9.5 0.4 1.7 20 -3.9 -31 -2.6 ~68
5 Percent change, ann. rate
Percent of trer.d" 105.4 104.8 104.5 104) 102.0 101.1 'J97 97.3
6
7 Implicit pricedeflator
111.6 114.6 118.0 1216 0972 = 1001 102.9 104.7 106.6 109.1
5.9 70 7.5 9.7 9.5 11.:; 12.4 12.7
8 Percent change. ann. rate
Selected Componrnts of
9 Personal consumption expend,-
748.1 767.7 766.8 770.4 765.9 761.8 761.9 764.7 tures
10 Percent of GNP 622 622 62.1 61.5 62.2 62.8 63.3 62.9
11 Fixed ncnresidential investment 1285 130.7 132.5 132.4 Ins 131(, 127.3 121.8
12 Percent of GNP 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.6 10.6 10.5 10.5
13 Fixed residential investment 64.4 62.0 58.3 54.0 49.9 47.0 43.9 39.3
14 Percent of GNP 54 5.3 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.4
15 Change in business inventories 11.7 14.8 14.1 25.4 11.4 9.4 5.1 80
16 Percent of GNP 0.9 1.2 1.2 2.1 0.9 0.9 0.5 0)'
17 Govl. purchases of goods & ser-
vices 2552 251.2 2516 252.0 255.4 256.1 257.1 256.9
18 Percent oi GNP 21.0 20.6 20.4 20.5 210 21.3 21.6 22.0
Other Selected Indicators
19 Indus. production index
(1907 = 100) 127.5 129.3 130.6 131A 129.6 131.0 131.8 124.6
20 Employees on nonagricultural pay-
rolls (miWons) 75.9 76.7 77.2 77.9 782 78.5 78.7 78.3
21 Unemployment rale (percen, of
labor/orce) 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.6 5.0 5.1 5.6 67
Composite Indexes (1967 = 100;
22 12 leading indICators 133.0 132.7 131.9 130.1 129.1 126.4 120.7 111.9
23 4 co;ncident indicators 124.8 125.9 126.9 1283 126.2 1256 125.2 1198
24 (, lagging indicators 114.4 120.4 128.9 132.3 133.4 141.0 146.5 1457
NOTE: Series are used in seasonally adjusted form. P=specific cycle peak; T=Specific cycle trough.
aTrend estimated from twenty-five-quarter moving averageof thedata.
!>.rhe data in the odd-numbered lines are all in billions of 1972 dollars at annual ratl's. The data in the other lines are percent ratios of
the expenditure component identified on the preceding line to GNP in current dohars for the same quarter, times 100.
'The leading index includes average workweek in manufacturing (mfg.l; layoff ratl', mfg. (invenE'd); enntracts and orders for plant and
equipment, 1967 dollars; net business formalion; common stock price index; new building permits for private homing; vendor per-
formallee, percent of companies reporting slower deliveries; money balallCl'S (M 11 in 1967 dollars; percent change in tolal liquid
assets; net change in inventoril's on hand and on order, 1967 dollars; percent changl' in prices of crude materials lexduding foods
and feeds); new orders for consumergoods and materials, 1%7dollars (see BCD, May 1975, for further detail). The co,"cid"nt index
includes the series listed in lines 18and 19above; personal income less transfers, 1967dollars; mfg. and trade sales, 1967dollars lsee
BCD, November 1975>' The lagging index includes: average duration of unemployment, inverted; unit labor cost, mfg.; mfg. and
trade inventories, 1%7 doliars; commercial and industrial bank loans outstanding; average prime rate; ratio consumer installment
debt to personal income (see BCD, November 1975).1975 1976
First Second Third Fourth First Second Third Fourth
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
(9) (10) (11 ) (12) (1)) (14) (15) (16)
and Constant Dollars and Implicit Price Deflator
1,446.2 1,4823 1,548.7 1,588.2 1,636.2 1,675.2 1,709.8 1,745.1
-0.8 10.4 19.1 10.6 12.6 9.9 8.5 8.3
'l9.2 99.6 102.0 1025 1035 103.8 103.8 1038
1,161.1 1,177.1 1,209.3 1,219.2 1,246.3 1,2600. 1.272.2 1,21l0.4
-9.9 5.6 11.4 3.3 9.2 4.5 3.9 2.4
94.2 94.8 96.7 969 983 98.7 99.0 99.0
124.6 125.9 128.1 130.3 131.3 133.0 134.4 136.3
10.1 4.5 7.0 7.1 3.2 52 4.4 5.7
Real GNP and Shares of GNpb
7546 767.5 775.3 783.9 800.7 808.6 815.7 829.7
64.5 64.8 63.8 63.7 63.8 63.6 63.7 64.3
114.4 110.6 110.1 110.5 112.1, 114.9 117.5 117.9
10.2 9.8 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.5
35.4 36.8 39.6 41.9 44.1 45.7 47.4 51.1
3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.3
-20.5 -21.2 - 1.0 -5.5 10.4 11.1 10.2 0.9
-15 -2.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.1
2';7.1 259.1 262.4 265.2 261.9 263.6 265.5 265.3
22.5 22.5 22.2 22.3 217 21.6 21.6 21.6
(quarterly aver. of monthly data)
113.2 114.2 120.5 123.4 127.0 129.4 130.9 131.7
76.9 76.5 77.0 77.8 78.7 79.3 79.7 80.1
8.1 8.8 8.6 8.4 7.6 7.5 7.8 7.9
quarterly aver. of monthly data)C
106.6 112.1 118.4 119.3 122.1 124.4 125.7 127.4
112.4 112.0 115.1 117.1 120.0 122.1 H2.7 123.8
138.7 127.8 124.4 123.5 120.2 120.0 121.7 121.3486
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=
because of factors other than income that acted to depress consumerattitude,
and expectations. The persondl saving rate, u~like som? past episodes, did not
decline even briefly as income weakened; Instead, It climbed from 6.8 to
8.7 percent of disposable income d.uring 1973.. This was associat.ed with a
sham decline in personal consumption expenditures on automobiles, and a
sub;tantial one in consumer spending on durable goods generally.4
A plausible hypothesis, which has been recently advanced and tested with
relative success, is that accelerating, unanticipated inflation tends to depress
consumer demand by augmenting uncertainty about future changes in real in-
come and raising the probability that real income may decline (Sandmo 1970,
Juster and Wachtel 1972, Juster 1973, Juster and Taylor 1975, and Wachtel
19771. The greater the uncertainty, the higher are the personal saving rates that
are expected to prevail at given levels of the other determinants of consumer
behavior, notably real income and real financial wealth of households.
There are strong indications that expected inflation rates, though rising fast
by historical standards, lagged far behind and thus underestimated greatly the
actual rates. The evidence comes from data on price anticipations of the
general public, from price-level forecasts by professional business analysts and
economists, and from various contemporary comments and reactions. As an il-
lustration, we tabulate below the median predictions of percent changes in the
GNP implicit price deflator based on a quarterly survey of a sizable sample of
economic forecasters: 5
Rates of Change in CNP Imglicit Price Deflator
Predicted, by Date of Survey
Period
Covered Dec.1972 Feb.1973 May 1973 Sept. 1973 Dec. 1973 Actual
1972:4-1973:1 3.6 4.9 5.7
1973:1-1973:2 3.2 3.6 4.5 7.0
1973:2-1973:3 3.6 3.6 4.5 5.3 8.2
1973:3-1973:4 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.9 6.1 8.7
l~ w~lI. be noted that, even in the latter part of 1973, inflation for that year was
slgmflCantly underestimated, although naturally to a much smaller extent than
earlier in the year.
Whatever the differences may be between economists' forecasts and ex-
~ect~tions of the public at large, the lag in the perception of the accelerating
1~f1at.,on was surely general and substantial.6 This is not too surprising, con-
sldermg ~ow sudden and sharp the inflation f1areup was. In terms of the annual
rates of mcrease in the consumer price index ((PI) over six-month spans, for
example, inflation rose from somewhat more than 3 percent in the first nine
months of 1972 to about 5, 7,81/2, and 91/2 percent in the last quarter of
1972 and the first three quarters of 1973, consecutively. As inflation persistedRecession and Recovery of 1973-1976 487
and accelerated, consumers undoubted!)' paid increasingly close and careful
attention to price changes. Since the rate of inflation grew more variable as
well as higher, it is likely to have increased the dispersion of inflationary expec-
tations and hence the personal saving rate .. in line with the real-income uncer-
tainty hypothesis.
In retrospect, it is possible to give a rather lengthy list of the factors that
probably contributed to the outburst of inflation: (j) the highly stimulative
monetary and fiscal policies of 1971 (in part) and 1972 (as a whole), which in
turn were responding to the sluggish recovery and high unemployment rates
of 1971; (iD exogenous influences that led to steep rises in prices of food, oil,
and basic materials, including imports; (iii) the consequences of the deprecia-
tion of the dollar; (iv) the allocative distortions and "catch-up" effects of wage
and price controls; and (v) the related increases in the attractiveness of export
markets and shortages at home.? But these rather complex developments,
which are still far from being fully documented and understood today, were to
a large extent obscure at the time.
The Index of Consumer Sentiment compiled by the Survey Research Center
dropped from 94.8 (february 1966 = 100) in the third quarter of 1972 to 71.8 a
year later. It was the largest continuous decline to the (at the time) lowest level
in the history of this series, which goes back to 1953. Thus there is no doubt
about the early and drastic deterioration in the mood of the consumer, judging
from an index which several studies (Hymans 1970; Juster and Wachtel 1972)
have found to represent an important determinant of consumer spending. The
index in turn has been fou nd to be affected by several presumptive causes of
consumer confidence (or diffidence): the inflation rate had the strongest nega-
tive influence overall, with unemployment the second strongest, followed by
the decline in the stock market (Lovell 1975l. 8
The sharp rise during 1973 in prices of raw materials (foodstuffs and feed-
stuffs, fuels, other minerals, and forest products) is generally attributed to ex-
panding world demand bolstered by the large accumulation of international
reserves and reduced supplies abroad of major agricultural products (mainly
because of poor harvests) and some metals (because of strikes and political
unrest). This rise, amounting effectively to much more than the 30 percent re-
ported in the overall statistics, has been estimated to account for 45 percent of
the increase in the CPI during 1973 (Popkin 1974l. It seems likely that large
amounts of crude commodities were purchased in 1973-1974 for holding
rather than processing in production. Trading in commodity futures markets
expanded dramatically. Speculation due to anticipations of price rises and, im-
portantly, fears of inadequate supply raised the demand for raw materials by
industrialusers.9
Shortages, misallocations, and major discrepancies between expectations
and subsequent realizations of prices (and hence also of real wages) evidently
combined to have disturbing effects on the growth of output and productivity.488
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Output per manhour in the privatE nonfarm sector reachpo a peak in the first
quarter of 1973, held steady at a lower level i~ the.next thre: quarters, then
decreased further through 1974. Concurrent with this decline In labor produc-
tivity was a decline in real wages (average h~urly earnings and average hourly
compensation in the private nonfarm sector, In constant dollars). These move-
ments were both considerably longer and larger than any other declines in
labor productivity and real wages in recent times. (In fact, since the end of
World War \I real wages had rarely decreased at all, and the few declines were
very short and small.) A partial explanation, at least, may lie in the increasing
relative importance of the service industries, where output per manhour and
hourly earnings are lower (see belowl.
Money wages (monthly data on average hourly earnings of nonfarm produc-
tion workers) increased in 1973 at annual rates of about 61/2 to 7percent,
only slightly higher than in 1972 and not out of line with the trend since
mid-19b7. Unit labor costs, remarkably stable in 1972, increased sharply in
1973 under the double impact of increases in employers' social security and
other payroll taxes and the cessation of growth in output per man-hour. Cor-
porate profits after taxes, and after inventory valuation and capital consump-
tion adjustments as well, sagged slightly during 1973, while profit margins,
computed on the same basis, declined sharply. Yet both consumer and whole-
sale prices rose at a sharply increased pace, outrunning wages and unit labor
costs. The major factor that helps to explain these at first blush puzzling devel-
opments is by now familiar: the explosive rise in the prices of food, fuel. and
raw materials. The great speedup in the rate of inflation coincided with, and is
in part attributable to, the pressures of world demand for farm products and
energy-generating materials upon the increasingly scarce supplies of these
commodities (with the external demands now becoming effective because of
the depreciation of the dollar and the related expansion of foreign money sup-
plies!. Further, it is evident that these unique developments caused a signifi-
cant temporary reallocation between the industrial and farm sectors, which
benefited few (farmers, some exporters) and hurt many in the U.s. economy
(consumers and most industrial employees and enterprisesJ.lO
However, threats to continuing expansion are seldom perceived promptly,
and on this occasion especially, public recognition seems to have lagged far
behind events. This is not so surprising in view of the novel and complex ele-
ments in the situation and the increased difficulty of measuring the ongoing
change. In particular, the problem of adjusting sales, orders, inventories, and
profits for changes in prices during an inflation of uncommon type and intensi-
ty created many uncertainties and inconsistencies.ll
Despite the developing slowdowns in sales and output, employment rose
SWiftly during nearly all of 1973, keeping the unemployment rate steady
though not reducing it (Table 2, lines 20-21). Only in October-November did
the growth of employment begin to slacken and the first upturns occur in theRecpssion and Recovery of 1973-1976 489
levels and rates of unemployment. Meanwhile, industrial production gained
very little after August and turned down ior several months after November.
Business investment expenditures on equipment in real terms kept rising
through 1973, though less vigorously than in the two preceding years of the
expansion, while investment in structures, which turned up late and increased
weakly in 1972-1973, peaked in the third quarter.12 Final sales in constant dol-
lars reached their peak in the third quarter, real GNP in the fourth (Table 2,
line 4l. The low-growth phase was giving way to declines in many economic
activities.
The 1973-1975 Recession
The specific peak dates listed in Table "I, column 2, span a period of twenty-
one months (February 1973-0ctober1974), which might seem a surprisingly
large dispersion over time in downturns of "roughly coincident" indicators. Ac-
tually, a few of these series do not display a systematic pattern of coincident
timing at peaks.13 Asmall part of the observed dispersion reflects this behavior,
but the main part is explained by the strength of the concurrent forces of infla-
tion and recession which were peculiar to the 1973-1975 period.
Accounts of the first stage of the recessiun have emphasized the adverse im-
pact on the economy of the huge rise in the price of imported oil. but it is im-
portant to realize that the energy crisis aggravated a situation that was already
precarious. Undoubtedly, the imposition in October 1973 of the Arab oil em-
bargo, which was to last through mid-March 1974, was a serious shock. The
concomitants of the embargo included shortfalls in automotive gasoline and
production cutbacks in the automobile and some other industries. The industri-
al production index for consumer goods declined from October 1973 through
February 1974, in large measure in response to supply constraints which
sharply raised production costs (the index then regained most of its losses
before turning down decisively in Augustl. Construction of housing suffered
substantially. Inventory investment, which reached a high peak in the fourth
quarter of 1973, dropped sharply in the next quarter. Despite continuing
strength in some sectors-especially in services and producers' durable equip-
ment-GNP in constant dollars declined and did not recover in 1974.
It is well to remember, however, that inflation, shortages, weaknesses in
consumption and in construction activity, and slowdowns in production all oc-
curred in 1973 prior to the reduction in the oil supply caused by the action of
the OPEC cartel. When that last shock was added to the earlier ones such as
the large increases in the prices of food and imports other than fuels, the com-
bined damage was too large to be effectively countered or absorbed by short-
term shifts in U.S. consumption and production patterns. By that time also,
slowdowns in other industrial countries were beginning to occur, with adverse
implications for the demand for U.s. exports. The immediate consequences,Victor Zarnowitz and C('()ffrey H. Moore
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then included (i) the production cutbacks mentioned above, (iiJ mOle upward
pre~~ure on actual and expected inflation rates, clnd (iii) mort' uuwnward pres-
sure on real income of the private nonfarm sector of the economy.
Consumer outlays on goods and housing continued to bear the brunt of
these adversities. The decline in retail sales of durable goods stores, which had
begun several months before the oil embargo, noW accelerated considerably;
total retail sales in current dollars rose but slowly In the dosmg months of 1973
and registered a substantial loss in real terms. With interest rates moving up
and stock prices down at increased rates, there was further erosion of real
spendable income and real net worth of households in 1974. As inflation in
terms of the annual rates of change in the CPI rose to 11 and 12 percent and
the unemployment rate increased steadily from 5 to 6 and then 7 percent of
the labor force, the consumer sentiment index fell from 76 in the fourth quarter
of 1973 to 58 a year later, recording a further sharp drop in consumer confi-
dence.
While there is, with the beneiit of hindsight. little doubt about the qualita-
tive nature or general diiection of these developments, it is worth noting again
that the available quantitative measures of changes in inflation and real eco-
nomic activity are far from precise, particularly for a period as turbulent as
1973-1974. Comparisons of deflated value aggregates with series in physical
units for a given industry or sector provide forceful and instructive reminders of
this fact.
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In 1974expected inflation rates continued rising but actual inflation acceler-
ated still faster, as shown by the tabulation below:
1>
Rates of Change in GNP Implicit Price Deflator
Period
Covered
Predicted, by Date of.~Sc=u=--,rv~eLY _
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(Iearty, the intensity of the inflation was systematically underestimated in
1974 as in 197.3, only more so. Forecasts of real GNP and unemployment also
erred substantially on the optimistic side. As disappointments mounted and
expectations correspondingly became less sanguine, real consumption expen-
ditures stagnated through most of the year 1974 as did real disposable in-
comeH
On the other hand, business income was not Visibly impaired by inflation for
some time and weakened only as the recession widened in 1974. Net corpo-
rate profits, in current or constant dollars, peaked in the third quarter of 1974.Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 491
After inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, profits de-
clined mildly in 1973 and sharply in1974, aCLOrding tu the prl'~ellt data; but
this is hardly how most businessmen perceived them at the time. Profits and in-
ventories, always difficult to measure, were subject to especially large distor-
tions in the current data for this inflationary period. In any event, business
spending, in contrast to consumer spending, continued strong well into the re-
cession. Thus business fixed investment in current dollars rose throughout
1974; in constant dollars, it began to decline in the second quarter. Also, busi-
ness inventories (book value) were being sharply increased through 1974,
though again, inventory investment after valuation adjustment turns out to
have declined substantiall;' during that year.
The strength of business investment in materials and equipment (measured
in current dollars) is usudlly reilected in an expansion of unfilled orders held by
manufacturers, as new orders tend to rise faster than shipments for the prod-
ucts involved, mainly durable and in large part made-to-order goods (Zar-
nowitz 1973, chaps. 6, 8, ilnd 9). Indeed, the value of durable orders backlogs
increased continually and vigorously-over 70 percent-in the two years pre-
ceding September 1974, when it reached a peak of $189 billion. New orders
received by durable goods manufacturers crestEd at $51 billion in August;
those for nondefense capital goods, at $14 billion in July. But adjustments ior
inflation wipe out the 1974 rises in these series: in constant dollars, new orders
for durabie goods gained little between March and November 1<)73 and de-
clined thereafter, while new orders for capital goods rose strongly in 1973,
then remained essentially unchanged for several months early in 1974, and fell
sharply in the second half of the year. Contralts and expenditures for commer-
cial and industrial plant construction show a definite contraction beginning late
in 1973.
The reasons for this apparent turmoil and divergent movement in nominal
and real investment are still far from clear. Many businessmen presumably
scrambled to place orders for materials because of anticipated capacity short-
ages and fears of more inflation, and their apprehensions proved only too true
(and in part self-fulfilling). Some of the investment in commodity stocks, as
noted earlier, reflected speculation. At the same time, the accumulation of bus-
iness on hand may have encouraged some firms to proceed with their capital
investment projects. However, real gains from investment dwindled, and even
the nominal gains could continue only as long as many businessmen failed to
perceive the spreading weakness of consumer demand and their own profit
position. The unusually long lag of recognition and adjustment was corre-
spondingly costly; once it drew to a close, in mid-1974, business ordering was
cut back drastically.17
The highly uneven incidence of the forces of contraction is reflected in both
the course and changing composition of the comprehensive aggregates of out-
put and employment. Real GNP declined nearly 4 percent at annual rates in the492
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'Nt in
1967 1974 Peaks 1973 Peaks
. f 1974· the index of industri,11 production lost 1.5Iwrcer.t be- fIrst quarter0, ...
N ber 1973 and February t974. Alter the 011 embargo WJS Ilited tween ovem ( .-
rea! GNP contInued to dedine at somewhat. lower rates In the next two quar-
ters (Table 2, line 2), while industrial productIon rose 1.7 percent between Feb-
d J e and then resumed a slow downward drift through September ruary an un . .
Several of the current-dollar aggregates of sales, 10C0111<:>'.and thC' ~alue of out-
put did not decline at all for periods long enough to q.ualrfy as cycltcal contrac-
. nd those few that did turned down late, 10 August-October (see tlons, a ,
Chart 1 and Table 1). This, again, clearly reflects the strength of tne continuing
inflation.
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The index of industrial production clearly shows adouble-peak pattern, with
the first high of 131.6 (1967 := 100) in November 1973 slightly below the sec-
ond high of 131.9 in June 1974.
19The decisive downturn in the total index oc-
curred only in October 1974. The major components of the index present a
very mixed picture, as illustrated by the following tabulation:
wt. in
1967
Durable consumer goads General business supplies
(September) 8% (June} 70- 1o
Materials, fuel and power Nondurable consumer goods
(December) 38 (August) 21
Construction products Business eqUipment
(December) b (September) 13
Defense equipment (October) 7
52% 48%
In terms of these market categories, declines in the output of materials, dura-
ble consumer goods, and construction products tended to turn the index
down in late 1973. The renewed strenp,th of the index in the summer of 1974
can be attributed principally to consumer nondurables, business equipment
and supplies, and defense equipment. Many series in these late-tuming
categories are based upon kilowatt-hour consumption and man-hour inputs
rather than direct measures of physical output. This may have imparted an up-
ward bias to the index in this period (see the last paragraph of the appendix to
this paper for an elaboration). Equipment production has often lagged in the
past, but more so at troughs than at peaks and rarely by long intervals.
In the earlier post-World War II recessions, industrial production typically
turned down a few months before the business cycle peak, probably in large
part because output of materials declined early, reflecting the usual lead of in-
ventory investment. On this occasion materials output and total inventory in-
vest~en.t in constant dollars both peaked in the fourth quarter of 1973, but the
dechne rn the former was not appreciable until the fourth quarter of 1974Recession and Recovery oi 1973-1976 493
despite the sharp drop in the latter. Also, in previous cycles the industrial pro-
duction index reached its peak at about the same time as or a few months
before the peak in output of goods as measured in the national accounts. But
this time goods output peaked in the fourth quarter of 1973 and declined con-
tinuously thereafter, while industrial production fell and then rose again. It
should be noted that the industrial production index does not include the out-
put of the construction industry, which had declined early and sharply in
1973-1974. According to the national accounts, the output of goods and
structures leveled off after the first quarter of 1973, reached its final peak in the
fourth quarter, and fell steadily thereafter, so that by the third quarter of 1974
it was down more than 5 percent, whereas the industrial production index was
still above its previous high. If construction activity were included in the indus-
trial production index, as has long been urged, the weakness in the industrial
sector of the economy in 1974 would have been plainer than the actual index
now shows it to be.1o
Total employment-persons and hours-continued rising in 1974 for eight
months or more afte'r aggregate output had turned down and unemployment
had turned up (see Chart 1 and tables 1 and 2). Short lags of employment at
business cycle turns have occurred in the past, but the U.S. employment aggre-
gates have generally exhibited roughly coincident timing. At the eight business
cycle peaks between 1929 and 1969, nonfarm employment lagged twice (by
two and three months, respectively), led four times, and coincided twice. Part
of the explanation for the unusually long lag in 1973-1974 probably lies in the
compositional shifts on both the demand and the supply side of the labor
market part in the widespread failure to recognize (or the tendency to under-
estimate) the weakness of the economy. The net accessions were concen-
trated in the service industries (jncluding government), which in terms of em-
ployment have long been growing more rapidly than the rest of the economy.
Service employment is relatively stable cyclically because overhead labor,
workers in white-collar occupations, and compensation on a piecework basis
are all particularly important here. Furthermore, because services cannot be
stored, inventory swings are not a factor. Employment in the goods-producing
sector (mining, manufacturing, and construction) turned down in Novem-
ber 1973 and declined steadily thereafter. But the rise in the service sector,
which now accounts for roughly two-thirds of total employment, offset this
decline until the autumn of 1974.
It is interesting to note that the service industries have had a more powerful
stabilizing effect on employment than on output. The output of services, as
measured in the national accounts, has usually risen during recessions, helping
to offset the decline in output of goods and structures, just as in the case of
employment. Moreover, the long-run growth in services output has been faster
than in goods output; so its stabiliZing effect on output, as well as on employ-
ment, has been rising. But the relative importance of services is significantly494
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greater in terms of employment than in terms of ?utput. Two-thirds of the em-
ployed are now engaged in the service industries, but they account for less
than half of total output. As a result, total employment rose during 1974 while
total output fell, and the drop in employment in 1974-1975 was brief and
moderate while the drop in output was prolonged and severe. The trend has
been working in this direction during the entire postwar period, with the result
that employment has become increasingly stable relative to output. In the
1948-1949 recession the percent decline in total employment greatly ex-
ceeded the percent decline in real GNP; by 1973-1975, the decline in employ-
ment was only a third as large as in GNP (d. Table 6, lines 2 and 8, below). One
effect or this has been to lower the overall rate of productivity growth and
enlarge its cyclical swing.
These effects of service industry growth can be readily documented. The
percent changes between 1973, the peak year in reai GNP, and 1975, the










Within each sector output and employment behaved much alike; yet there
was a substantial drop in total output and a small rise in total employment
because of the greater importance of services in the employment total. The























Arough estimate of the effect of the shift in the importance of services can be
made by applying the 1948 proportions to the 1973-1975 changes. The shift
reduced the decline in real GNP by half a percentage point (from -4.3 percenl
down to - 3.8 percent) and converted what would have been a decline in total
employment to a rise (from -1.1 percent to +0.4 percent). Productivity
growth has been adversely affected. Output per employed person dropped
4.2 percent belween 1973 and 1975. Without the growth in importance of
services the drop would have been only 3.2 percent. The effect on output p€r
man-hour would be smaller because average hours worked per employee is
smaller in services than in goods production.
Growth of the civilian labor force was unusually fast (J percent) during 1973
and much slower (1.9 percent) during 1974 (compare these figures with theRecessi!Jn and Recovery of 1973-1976 495
averages of 2.3 percent in 1968··1972 and 1.8 percent in 1963-1967). The ac-
celeration of the labor force trend beginning in the years preceding the reces-
sion reflected primarily a more rapidly growing population of working age and
increases in certain participation rates, especially of women. Increased efforts
of families to stem the inroads of inflation upon their living standards very
probably drew additional persons into the labor market. During recessions
"added workers" typically enter the market to bolster family income reduced
or threatened by unemployment, shorter hours, or lower nonwage income, but
this is more often than not outweighed by the tendency for some unemployed
workers to become "discouraged" and withdraw from the job search. Semian-
nual comparisons indicate a net decline in the labor force growth rates during
the second half of 1973 and both halves of 1974. The quit rate, which reached
a high plateau in 1973, declined early but not much and then remained rather
stable through mid-1974. Workers as well as employers seem to have adopted
a cautious but still hopeful stance in face of an uncertain situation which many
viewed at the time as one of transitory troubles due to energy shortages rather
than as an incipient recession. Thus businessmen continued to cut working
hours (the average workweek in manufacturing drifted downward after Febru-
ary 1973) but kept layoffs low, presumably hoping to weather a short slack
period without incurring the risk of losing experienced employees and the cost
of high labor turnover.
Such tactics, however, can be followed but briefly, since they entail reduce~
productivity and rising labor costs per unit of output, with adverse effects on
profits. Those tactics were not only dropped but sharply reversed as soon as it
became clear that the economy was not going to rebound vigorously from the
setback attributed to the embargo. By the third quarter of 1974, the persis-
tence of inflation at alarming two-digit rates could no longer disguise the dete-
rioration of real sales and profits, and sharp cutbacks in production and em-
ployment ensued (see Table 2) as enterprises attempted to gain control over
rising inventories of finished goods and accelerating costs of production.
This phase of the recession bears a close family resemblance to contractions
in aggregate demand that are typical of the "classical" business cycle. Much of
the dramatic decline in total output during the last quarter of 1974 and the first
of 1975 can be traced to the rapid fall in inventory investment (see Table 2).
Such developments are ordinarily explained by business attempts to reduce
stocks so as to bring them into adesired relationship with expected sales. (This
relationship is the core of the acceleration principle and the more general
stock-adjustment principle as applied to inventory investment.) With this
added depressant effect on income and spending, manufacturing and trade
sales contracted fast enough for several months to frustrate the apparent busi-
ness intentions to reduce inventory-sales ratios.
21 With the advent of 1975,
however, inventory reductions took hold, and soon the rise in the overall ratio
of business inventories to sales was arrested and reversed.496 Victor Zarnowitz and Geoffrey H. Moore
Other factors also contributed to the economy's sharp contraction in the
fall-winter season 1974-1975. Business capital outlays on plant and equipment
and consumer capital outlays on housing and automohiles declined in current
dollars and, substantially, in constant dollars. In particular, the decline in real
residential investment accelerated strongly in this period. In fact, all major ex-
penditure components of real GNP decreased in the fourth quarter of 1974.
But in the first quarter of 1975 total personal consumption expenditures turned
upward, and so did state and local government purchases of goods and ser-
vices.
Changes in money and credit appear to have played a more moderate role in
the developments of 1973-1974 than in the earlier slowdown-and-recession
phases of recent business cycles. In the last years of expansion preceding the
business cycle peaks of 1953, 1960, and 1969, both the narrowly defined and
the broader monetary aggregates showed sharply falling rates of growth rela-
tive to their long trends; in late 1972 and in 1973, the monetary growth rates
declined also, but much less strongly and less abruptly.22 However, unlike the
previous business recessions, during each of which monetary aggregates in-
creased at accelerated rates, the 1974 contraction was accompanied first by
relatively steady and then, particularly in the third quarter, by declining rates of
growth in these series. The slow growth of the money stock at this time has
been blamed by some analysts for the marked weakening of the demand for
goods and services (as represented by current-dollar GNP) in the two quarters
ending March 1975. But this particular linkage would imply an unusually
prompt and strong reaction to what the present statistics show was a relatively
brief and mild dip in the growth of money stock in nominal terms, which is the
unit of measure relevant to current-dollar GNP. In real terms, owing to the high
and rising rate of inflation, the money stock entered upon an extended and
substantial decline early in 1973, and by mid-1974 had dropped about as
much as it did prior to and during the 1957-1958 recession. But real GNP
dropped faster and further than it did then. Moreover, the hypothesis that the
extensive decline in the real money stock was responsible for the severity of
the recession runs up against the fact that reat GNP began a sustained recovery
early in 1975 and a year later had regained its preceding peak level, whereas
the real money stock meanwhile experienced no growth whatever.
In the past, slowdowns in economic growth have always been accompanied
by reductions in the rate of inflation, but the lag in this relationship has been
getting longer. On this occasion, it took several months of recession accom-
panied by declining rates of monetary growth before the pace of inflation
began to recede. Not until mid-1974 did decisive downturns occur in compre-
hensive measures of inflation-first in the rate of change in wholesale prices
for industrial commodities and soon thereafter in the rate of change in con-
sumer prices. (As usual, earlier signals of these reductions came from sensitive
price indexes relating to selected crude and industrial materials'> This helpedRecession and Recovery of 1973-1976 497
greatly to check the decline in rcaIincome and in consumer confidenrf'. Short-
term market interest rates and long-term bond yields generally turned down in
the third quarter of 1974, reducing the cost of credit. Stock prices stopped
falling in the fourth quarter. Retail sales in constant dollars, which led the se-
quence of downturns in 1973, now headed the succession of upturns in com-
prehensive indicators of economic activity, as recorded in Table 1 (column 3l.
From its low point in November 1974, consumer spendmg in real terms began
a solid advance. Although it was not generally recognized at the time, the end
of the recession was near.
The 1975-1976 Recovery
The revival of consumer expenditures on automobiles and durable goods in
general started well before the tax cut that took effect in May 1975, and even
before the prospect of lower tax payments began to exert a favorable influ-
ence upon people's spending plansP There are good reasons to think-the
likelihood of an inventory investment turnaround is onc of them-that the up-
turn of the economy in the spring of 1975 would have occurred when it did
without the tax cut, but also that the fiscal stimulation contributed substantial-
ly to the recovery later, in the second half of the year. Fiscal actions probably
had little, if any, net expansionary effect before 1975, whereas the initial signs
of an upturn came earlier.
24 Among these were the declines in the cost of cred-
it and in the cost of materials, mentioned above.
Only seven months (November 1974-]une 1975) separate the earliest from
the latest of the specific trough dates in the comprehensive series listed in
Table 1, in sharp contrast to the 21-month period spanned by the peaks of
1973-1974 (d. columns 2 and 3l. The transition from recession to recovery
was much swifter than the transition from expansion to recession. Lengthy
periods of economic slowdown in late expansion and relatively swift move-
ments out of recession into recovery have been typical of other recent busi-
ness cycles in the United States, particularly during 1955-1971.
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Initially, the recovery derived its strength almost entirely from consumer
spending, which more than compensated for the weaknesses in business in-
vestment and federal purchases. In the second quarter of 1975, real GNP in-
creased 5.6 percent at an annual rate, while personal consumption and resi-
dential construction increased approximately 7 and 17 p~rcent, respectively.
At the same time and measured the same way, nonresidential fixed investment
fell 14 percent, and total government purchases of goods and services de-
clined 3 percent. The liquidation of business inventories at all stages of fabrica-
tion proceeded at a rapid pace for another quarter, as shown in Table 2,
line15.
In the second half of 1975, growth of real consumption expenditures mod-
erated, but growth of real GNP soared to 11.4 percent in 1975:3 (among the498 Victor Zarnowill and Ceoffrey H. Moore
highest rates ever recorded and exceeded only rlming thf' rapid expansion of
19501, then fell to 3.3 percent in 1975:4. Of major importance here was the
sharp diminution of the downward pull on the economy exerted by inventory
liquidation. Moreover, real investment in residential structures increased
strongly, particularly in the third quarter. Nonresidential fixed investment in
1972 dollars declined very slightly in the third quarter and rose similarly in the
fourth. Purchases of goods and services at all levels of government increased
moderately.
Growth in real GNP reaccelerated to over 9 percent per year in the first
quarter of 1976, with most expenditure components scoring good gains
(Table 2). The gains for fixed investment, however, pertained to levels that
were slilllow, not much above the 1975 troughs and well below their average
levels for 1974. Inventory accumulation at the annual rate of $-10.4 billion re-
placed the liquidation phase of 1975. This turnaround, in fact, accounted for a
large part of the total rise in real GNP during winter 1976: final sales in 1972
dollars increased at an annual rate of slightly less than 4 percent. Total govern-
ment purchases of goods and services in constant dollars declinedsome 5 per-
cent.
In the second quarter of 1976, growth in real GNP fell to slightly less than
half the rate in the first quarter, but this was due entirely to a cessation of the
fast growth in business inventory investment. Final sales in real terms increased
a little over 4 percent owing to an equal proportional gain in consumption,
much larger gains in nonresidential and residential fixed investment (over 8 and
15 percent, respectively), and an unexpectedly small gain in government
spending. The index of industrial production moved up almost 8 percent at an-
nual rate in the second quarter, nonfarm employment almost 3 percent.
Finally, the data now available indicate that the expansion proceeded at a
still slower pace in the second half of 1976. Real GNP rose at annual rates of 3.9
and 2.6 percent in the third and fourth quarter, respectively. However, what
many contemporary observers deplored as a "pause" in the expansion was
again due largely to business inventory investment, which remained remark-
ably steady in the first three quarters of 1976, then dropped drastically in the
last.
2b Fina! sales in constant dollars increased at annual rates of 4.3 percent in
the third and 5.5 percent in the fourth quarter. To some extent, the retardation
in the growth of real GNP can also be traced to small gains or losses in the gov-
ernment sector and in fixed nonresidential investment.
These observations suggest that the recovery was widespread, but sup-
ported predominantly by gains in consumer spending (especially for automo-
biles and other durable goods) and by the transition from a massive disinvest-
ment to a modest investment in business inventories. Capital outlays on plant
and equipment and on housing, though rising at substantial rates, were still rel-
atively low; their contribution to recovery during the filst two years was unus-
ually small by historical standards.Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 499
Series in physical units provide additional evidence of the progress of this ex-
pansion. While real GNP rose 7 percent in the year ending March 1976, the in-
dex of industrial production rose by 15 percent. For GNP, the increase approxi-
mately matched the decline during the recession; for industrial production, the
previous peak levels were regained only by the end of the year. Employment,
meanwhile, had risen 3 to 4 percent above its trough levels of 1975 and al-
ready exceeded the previous peak recorded in 1974.27 The rise in employment
exceeded the growth in the labor force and unemployment dropped from its
high of9 percent in May1975 to 7.3 percent in May 1976, as many employees
were recalled to their previous jobs.
The summer slowdown interrupted this progress briefly. The expansion was
not robust enough to keep up with the persistently high rate of growth in the
labor force. Unemployment rose to an average rate of 7.8 percent in the third
quarter and reached 8 percent in November. Total civilian employment dipped
slightly in September and October but was rising at a good pace again by the
end of the year, and not only in terms of the number of persons with jobs but
also relative to the total population of working age.
Unemployment, however, remained very high during this recovery. Its unus-
ually slow decline has been attributed to several factors. First, the growth of
the labor force continued strong, reflecting in large part rapid increases in the
number of women and young people seeking work. Second, employment
gains were particularly large in service industries, where many people work
part-time, change jobs often, and have frequent spells of unemployment.
Third, increases in unemployment compensation, which is not taxable, may
have in effect subsidized and induced more temporary layoffs (Feldstein 1975,
1976l. Unemployment benefits were extended in 1973 and 1974, lowering the
costs of getting by without ajoband enabling more people to search longer for
better positions. Fourth, the increase in the average number of workers per
family, which represents a source of additional support to the unemployed
member, would have similar effects. The average duration of unemployment,
which varied narrowly around 10weeks from April 1973 through the end of
1974, rose rapidly to about 17 weeks by the end of 1975, then declined very
slowly and irregularly to 15 1/2 weeks late in 1976. Finally, the argument has
been advanced that many individuals who are not interested in working or are
only marginally employable now register as seeking jobs and are counted as
unemployed because of the introduction in the early 1970s of work registra-
tion requirements as a condition for receiving food stamps and other welfare
benefits (Clarkson and Meiners 1977).
Since output, as usual in a recovery, expanded much faster than employ-
ment, labor productivity advanced rapidly. The index of output per man-hour
in the private nonfarm economy (1.967 = 100) increased from 108 to nearly
115 between the first quarters of 1975 and 1976, thus making up in one year
for all the drop during the preceding two. lIts peak value was 114 in 1973:1.)500 Victor Zarnowitz and Geoffrey H. Moore
As a result of this gain, together with rather slower advances in wage rates, unit
labor costs declined somewhat during 1975 after having increased sharply in
1973 and 1974. Profit margins improved dramatically. The ratio of prices to
unit labor costs for the nonfarm business sector, which dropped substantially
during 1973 and 1974, rose sharply in 1975. Total corporate profits, having
fallen steeply in the last SIX months of the recession, made a strong comeback
in the next twelve months.
As the supply of internal funds from corporate cash flows grew rapidly while
business capita! outlays turned up late and slowly, the demand for external
funds fell sharply. Corporate bond placements were substantially reduced.
Short-term borrowing declined most of all, partly as a consequence of the
drastic inventory liquidation. Outstanding commercial and industrial loans
from banks started contracting at the end of 1974 and drifted downward
through most of the next two years. The shocks business confidence suffered
in 1974-1975 led to much caution in borrowing, committing, and spending
funds for inve5tment. There was widespread concern about weak balance
sheet positions and a strong motivation to improve them in the interests of li-
quidity and solvency. As a warning to many, business failures rose sharply dur-
ing the recession and reached unusually high levels late in 1975. So business
paid off large amounts of loans, mainly to banks, lengthened its debt structure,
and built up ownership claims and liquid assets (Gilbert '1976; Yang 19761.
Fixed investment was generally limited to what could be cautiously financed
by internal funds.
The rate of inflation in terms of the consumer price index was 7 percent dur-
ing 1975, a little more than half the corresponding figure of 12 percent for
1974. Moreover, the trend in that rate was definitely downward from
mid-1974 through spring 1976, though not without short reversals, as in the
summer of 1975. later in 1976, inflation was slightly higher, at rates averaging a
little over 5 percent. Price expectations, as usual, fluctuated much less than
realizations: the data in Table 3 show that the median ASA-NBER forecasts of
the GNP implicit price deflator turned out to be underestimates in periods oj
relatively high, and overestimates in periods of relatively low, inflation rates.
Overestimates prevailed among the forecasts for 1975:2 and for the first three
quarters of 1976.26
Evidently, inflation moderated at a frequently surprising pace. This is pre-
sumed to have contributed greatly to the improvement in the economic posi-
tion and outlook of the consumer and thereby to economic recovery at large.
Real wages, other incomes, and outlays of households increased sharply; real
disposable income rose even more sharply, as a result of the tax cut in May
1975, and soon recovered its previous peak level, reached in the fourth quarter
of 1973. Although unemployment was high, the percent of the population
withjobs was also relatively high, and this helped maintain incomes. The index
of consumer sentiment moved up from an all-time low of 58 (1966 = 100) inTABLE 3 Comparison of Median ASAINBER Forecasts of Inflation
Rate with Actual Rates, December 1974:4-·1976:4
Rates of Change in GNP Implicit Price Deflator
Predicted, b'{Date of Survet-
Period Dec. Feb. May Aug. Nov. March
Covered 1974 1975 1975 1975 1975 1976 Actual
1974:4-1975:1 9.1 9.1 10.1
1975:1-1975 :2 7.8 8.2 6.1 4.5
1975:2-1975:3 7.0 7.4 6.6 6.1 7.0
1975:3-1975:4 7.0 7.0 5.7 6.6 6.6 7.1
1975:4-1976:1 5.7 5.3 5.7 5.7 5.7 3.2
1976:1-1976:2 5.7 5.3 6.1 6.1 5.2
1976:2-1976:3 6.1 6.1 6.1 4.4
1976:3-1976:4 5.7 6.6 5.8
1975:1 to 84 in 1976:1. In contrast to business loans, households' borrowing
for the acquisition of automobiles, other durables, and housing increased as
sharply in 1975 as it fell in the preceding year.
Short-term interest rates, which reached record peaks of 12 percent and
more in autumn 1974, fell to 5-8 percent in 1975-1976; long-term rates such
as high-grade corporate bond yields fluctuated considerably but also ueclined
over the same period, from well over 10 to near 8 percent. These movements
presumably reflect reduced inflationary expectations as well as monetary de-
velopments and changes in the financial markets.
Growth rates in monetary aggregates, generally quite low early in 1975 and
high in the second quarter, declined considerably in the latter part of 1975,
then picked up once more and fluctuated widely but about more stable
average levels in 1976. The broader totals, which combine means of payment
with types of liquid assets of varying degree of "near-moneyness," grew at
higher and on the whole more stable rates than did the narrower totals. All in
all, monetary expansion proceeded unevenly over short time intervals and sus-
tained neither a rapid nor a very sluggish pace. However, the narrowly defined
money stock (M1) increased more slowly than the price level, with the result
that real money balances declined through the second half of 1975. In each of
the earlier business recoveries since the end of World War II, real money bal-
ances experienced a sustained rise, except for the 1950-1951 period of the
Korean War inflation. In the second half of 1975, when the slower growth of
M1 was causing some criticism of monetary policy as being overly restrictive,
there was an exceptionally large rise in the income velocity of money, at least
partly as a result of shifts to other means of payment.
Z9
Early in 1976, real money supply measured as (tvVCPIl1 00 increased slightly,
then remained virtually unchanged for the rest of the year. It should be noted502 Victor Zarnowitz and Ceoffrey H. Moore
that when M
l (which includes time deposits at commercial banks in addition
to the demand deposits dnd Lurrenq induded in MI) is analogously expressed
in real terms, the resulting series (M/CPI)100 shows a definite upturn in Janu-
ary 1975 followed by an expansion through 1976 interrupted only by several
months of nearly zero change in the second half of 1975.
Dating the Recession and the Recovery
The phase of slow growth preceding a recession is as a rule associated with a
spreading decline in the number of economic activities that are still expanding.
In short, as the overall pace of the expansion decreases, so too does its scope;
indeed, the latter process accounts in large part for the former. This can be il-
lustrated by the so-called diffusion indexes, which represent, for a particular
economic aggregate or index, the percent of components rising in successive
time spans.
Chart 3 shows diffusion series measuring the percent expanding of the com-
ponents of the indexes of leading, coincident, and lagging indicators. Since the
numbers of the components are small, the series often move in large irregular
jumps from month to month. Nevertheless, longer cyclical movements are dis-
cernible. Thus the diffusion index of the leading series, which reached its peak
values of 100percent late in 1972,dropped sharply during 1973, remained low
late in 1973 and early in 1974, anddropped to zero in the summer and autumn
of 1974. Soon thereafter it rose rapidly to 100 in May 1975 and then· fluctu-
ated, mostly between 50 and 75 percent, throughout 1976. Equally pro-
nounced declines during the recession and rises during the recovery are exhib-
ited by the two other diffusion series shown in Chart 3, with the major
movements in the coincident index follOWing those in the leading and preced-
ing those in the lagging index.
3D The leads and lags were such that at the time
the leading index reached zero, in June 1974, the lagging index was still about
70, and by the time the leading index had reached 100, in May 1975, the lag-
ging index was still at zero.
Diffusion indexes generally lead the corresponding aggregates of compos-
ites and are positively correlated on a roughly synchronous basis with the rates
of change in the same totals. This is so because when more than half of its
components are rising the aggregate itself typically rises, and the more compo-
nentsare rising the faster it usually rises. Hence when the (plus or minus) devia-
tions of a diffusion index from the base of50 percent are cumulated, the result
tends to be a comparatively smooth series with the same timing characteristics
as those of the corresponding aggregate or composite index. All this applies
well to the data discussed here. Chart 3 shows that the leading diffusion index
stayed low (generally at values not exceeding 50) from July 1973 through
March 1975; the coincident index, and also the overall index combining all
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d The diffusion indexes, which Me pUblished in Business Condilions Digest,
represent the percenlof jodie,iloT" rising during.1 six-month sp.m, ,cl~lcrcd
in the mid-month of the sp,m. The number of indic.llnrs included is shown
in p..trcnlhcscs. For .1 list of the St'rics, sec T.lble 2, note c. On their
,h.tr.lctcrbti,s ,lnd rJ.liOlMlc, sec Z,lrnowit/.•md Bosch.m (1975b, 1975,).504 Victor Zarnowilz and Geoffrey H. Moore
from October 1974 through February 1976. These data are either identiC,11
with or close to the peaks and troughs in the composite indexes of the leading,
coincident and lagging indicators. J1
Diffusion indexes help to show when recessions in economic activity be-
come widespread. We use them also, together with composite indexes, to
summarize the evidence on the cyclical timing of the principal indicators of ag-
gregate economic activity during 1973-1975 as it relates to the growth cycle
downturn and upturn and to the business cycle peak and trough. The individ-
ual series used for this purpose, in seasonally adjusted form, are shown in
Chart 1; the corresponding series of deviations from the trend estimates, in
Chart 2. Composite indexes based on these series are computed by standardiz-
ing the monthly percent changes in the component series so as to prevent the
more volatile series from dominating the index; averaging the standardized
changes for the several components for each successive month; and cumu-
lating the results into a monthly index. Diffusion indexes, based on the same
series, show in cumulated form the excess of the percent of indicators expand-
ing over the percent contracting, using cyclical peaks and troughs to define
these phases.Jl Both types of index are informative and in a sense compl~­
mentary. Acomposite index has two distinguishing features as compared with
a diffusion index: (j) it takes into account not just the direction, but the size, of
changes in the series covered; (ii) it does not depend on the choice of specific
peak and trough dates in the individual indicators. On the other hand, the dif-
fusion index reflects the consensus of cyclical highs and lows in the indicators,
ignoring most of the blips due to such things as unusual weather or strikes. It
answers more directly the question, When did contraction become more
widespread than expansion, or vice versa.
The composite index based on the deviations from trend of the eleven indi-
cators in real terms listed in Table 1, lines 1-7, 9-12, reached a peak in
March 1973 after a strong expansion that began in November 1970 (Chart 4).
The index varied but little during the next nine months, marking the 1973
phase of low growth. Similarly, the historical cumulative diffusion index based
on the same set of indicators reached a high plateau in March and remained
substantially unchanged through most of the year. This reflects peaking of the
trend-adjusted data early in 1973 in real income and sales, but late in 1973 in
the employment series (Chart 2).
The detrended current-dollar indicators reached their peaks generally be-
tween August and November of 1973 (Table 1, lines 13-19), but this, of
course, reflects the impact of inflation, which masked the slowdown in real
growth during this period. In our judgment, based on the evidence in Table 1
and charts 2 and 4, the best choice for a reference date to mark the beginning
of the ~Iowdown (the peak of the growth cycle) is March 1973.
The indexes based on the series proper (i.e., without trend adjustment) point
to November 1973 as the last month of business cycle expansion. The com-CHART 4 Composite Index and Cumulative Diffusion Index of Deviations from Trend,
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1972
posite index of the eleven real indicators reached its peak in that month and
the cumulative diffusion index reached a high plateau (Chart 5),33 Novem-
ber 1973 is also the median and, approximately, the mean month in the timing
distribution of the specific peaks in this set of data. Most of the current-dollar
indicators, propelled by inflation, had no specific-cycle contractions at all dur-
ing this recession (Table 1, columns 2 and 3),34 On the strength of the data pre-CHART 5 Composite Index and Cumulative Diffusion Index of Original Data,
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sented in Table 1 and charts 1 and 4, we conclude that November1973 is the
appropriate choice for the peak date in the NBER business cycle chronology.
The choice of March for the growth cycle peak and November for the business
cycle peak is the same as that made in an earlier study on the basis of the more
limited and more preliminary evidence then available (see Moore 1975).Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 507
A low-growth phase will start befure the aLlual dt:cline in general business
activity if the economy grows at less than its long-terrn trend rate prior to the
business cycle peak; this often happens and the 1973 developments illustrate
it well. Such a phase need not encompass it business cycle contraction (reces-
sion) but, if it does, it cannot, of course, end before the contraction ends. It
can, however, end latEr and will do so if the economy expands after the busi-
ness cycle trough at a slower rate than that of the growth trend. Timing dis-
crepancies of the latter sort are not very frequent and tend to be small in any
event, because business expansions in their early (recovery) stages are often
vigorous. In 1975 the troughs in the business cycle and the growth cycle were
approximately synchronous.
Indeed, as shown in Table 1 (columns 3 and 4) and charts 1 and 2, most of
the indicators of aggregate economic activity turned up in the short interval
between February and June 1975, and so did the corresponding series of the
deviations from trend. The business cycle trough is easy to date on the evi-
dence of Table1, column 3, and charts 1 and 5: the troughs in both the com-
posite and cumulative diffusion indexes occur in March 1975 and the measures
of central tendency derived from the timing distribution of the specific troughs
confirm that choice. For the growth cycle upturn, a close reading of the evi-
dence in Table 1, column 4, and charts 2 and 4 suggests that March, April, or
May 1975 are possible choices, with little to choose among them. We have
concluded that there is a slight preponderance of evidence in favor of March,
the same month as the business cycle trough. What this means is that econom-
ic activity reached its lowest point in March, and that the fate of growth very
quickly rose above the long-run trend rate.
Table 4 shows that in previous business cycles, as well as in 1973-1975, re-
cession typically followed the onset of a low-growth phase, while recovery
was approximately synchronous with the onset ot a high-growth phase. (On
three occasions since 1948-in 1951-1952, 1962-1964, and 1966-1967-
low-growth phases interrupted business expansions but did not degenerate in-
to business contractions.) The chronologies listed in the table will help identify
the cyclical episodes that are included in the comparative analysis to follow.
[3) CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS DURING 1973-1976
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Business cycles cannot be reduced to any single dimension: they consist of nu-
merous, diverse, and intricately connected processes shaped by many eco-
nomic and other events. Business contracttons have historically varied much in
length, amplitude, and scope, and so have business expansions. These three
criteria-duration, depth, and diffusion-can be used to compare cyclicalTABLE 4 Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions and High- and Low-Growth Phases in the United States, 1948-1975





Reference Dates Reference Dates
(T fr0m Expansion Phase (D from Phase
Trough (T) Peak rPl previous P) (T to Pl Upturn (Ul Downturn (0) previous U.l (U to D)
line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 ,\Jov.1948 July 1948
2 Oct. 1949 11 Oct. 1949 March 1951 15 "i7
3 July 1953 45 July 1952 March'1953 16 8
4 May 1954 Aug.1957 10 39 Aug.1954 Feb.1957 17 30
5 April 1958 April 1960 8 24 April 1958 Feb. 1960 14 22
6 Feb. 1961 10 Feb. 1961 May 1962 12 15
7 Oct. 1964 June 1966 29 20
8 Dec. 1969 106 Oct. 1967 March 1969 16 17
9 Nov. 1970 Nov. 1973 11 36 Nov. 1970 March 1973 20 28
10 March 1975 16 March 1975 24
11 Average 11 50 Average 18 20
SOURCE Nationdl BureJu oi EcunomlC Rest'.:uch. lilC.Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 509
movements. They refer to distinct, although not independent, aspecls of cycli-
cal movement. Each is important, and each can be measured ex post III reason-
ably objective and accurate ways. Cyclical movements can also be compared
in detail as they proceed by computing cyclical patterns for different economic
indicators, starting from business cycle peaks or troughs and moving forward
month by month or quarter by quarter. The similarities or differences between
current developments and those at corresponding stages of earlier business cy-
cles can be readily examined by this device. In the next section we compare
the1973-1975 recession with its predecessors in terms of duration, depth, and
diffusion. In the following section, we take up the comparison of bOlh the re-
cession and the ensuing recovery in terms of cyclical patterns.
Duration, Depth, and Diffusion of Recessions
Table 5, based on the revised and updated business cycle chronology of the
National Bureau, shows that the 1973-1975 recession lasted sixteen months,
while the five earlier recessions since the end of World War II lasted from eight
to eleven months Uine 1). However, different durations and ranks are obtained
depending on which individual series or indexes are used, partly because of
systematic differences in the cyclical timing of economic processes and partly
because of random influences and measurement errors involved in the deter-
mination of cyclical turning points. Contractions in the principal indicators of
income, sales, production, and employment generally overlap in each reces-
sion, but they are not exactly coincident and indeed their durations vary con-
siderably. The correlations between ranks based on the duration measures for
the different series are in general positive but not high. Those between busi-
ness cycle durations, on the one hand, and the index of coincident indicators,
real GNP, and averages for thirteen selected indicators, on the other hand
(lines 12-14 and 23) range from 0.5 to 0.7. 35 The ranks for the employment
series (lines 18, 19, 22) are substantially different and show either no correla-
tions or low negative correlations with the ranks based on the business cycle
chronology.J6
That the consensus among the ranks for the five recessions of 1948-1970 is
only moderate is not surprising, since these recessions have not varied much in
duration according to the NBER chronology. On the other hand, all the mea-
sures in Table 5, except those derived from the industrial production, employ-
ment, and unemployment data, show the 1973-1975 recession to have been
the longest since the end of World War II. Industrial production, as shown ear-
lier, had a double-peak configuration in 1973-1974: it stopped rising in the
autumn of 1973, though it did not definitely decline until almost a year later.
The exceptionally brief decline in employment (total employment declined
for only eight months) was, at least in part, the consequence of the trend
noted earlier. Declines in employment in theservice industries have been brief-TABLE 5 Ranking of Six Periods of Recession by Duration of Cyclical Decline, 1948-1975
--
Peaks and Troughs of Business Cycle Contractions"
Nov. 1948 July 1953 Aug. 1957 April 1960 Dec. 1969 Nov. 1973
Oct. 1949 May 1954 April 1958 Feb. 1961 Nov. 1970 March 1975
Line (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration of Cyclical Decline, in Monthsb
1 Business cycle chronology' 11 10 8 10 11 16
2 Index, 4 coincident indicatorsc 12 10 13 10 13 16
VI 3 GNP in' 1958dollars (Q) 6 12 6 12 15 15
""'" 4 Personal income less transfers, C>
1967 dollars· 9 10 6 5 3 19
5 Mfg. & trade sales, 1967 dol-
lars· 10 14 14 12 13 16
6 Retail sales, 1967 dollars ad 10 7 12 18 20
7 Industrial production index· 15 8 14 13 13 9
8 Total civilian employment 11 16 9 7 11 8
9 Employees on nonagr. payrolls· 13 16 14 10 8 9
10 Persons engaged in nonagr. ac-
tivities, household survey 12 16 13 8 5 8
11 Unemployment rate 22 15 16 23 27 19Ranking According to Duration of Cyclical Decline"
12 Business cycle chronology" 4.5 2.5 1 2.5 4.5 6
13 Index, 4 coincident indicators' 3 1.5 4.5 1.5 4.5 6
14 GNP in 1958 doliars (Q) 1.5 3.5 1.5 3.5 5.5 5.5
15 Personal income less transfers,
1967 dollars' 4 5 3 2 1 6
16 Mfg. & trade sales, 1967 dol-
lars' 1 4.5 4.5 2 3 6
1'7 Industrial production index' 6 1 5 3.5 3.5 2
18 Total civilian employment 4.5 6 3 1 4.5 2
19 Nonfarm employment, payroll
survey' 4 6 5 3 1 2
20 Unemployment rate 4 1 2 5 6 3
\J1 21 5 deflated aggregates' 1 5 3 2 4 6 -l
-l 22 5 employment series3 4 6 5 2 3 1
23 13 indicatorsh 2 5 3.5 1 3.5 6
'Denotes SNles Included in composite mdexes. lines 2 and 13
"A,cording to the «'vised NBER refprence chronology See accompanYing text and Zarnowltz and Boschan 11975.1).
bMeasured from business Cycll' peak to business cycle trough iline 1) or from specific cycle peak to specifiC cycle trough Ilines 2-101.
(Composite of the four se.ies m",ked by asterisks below. with fixed rates and standard,z.1t,on factors. 51'''' Z",nowitz and Boschan 11975cl
dNa specifIC cycle contr."tion, or no decline at least five months long.
"A rank of 1 means that the cyclical decline was the shortest of those obs..rved for the SiX rec.."ions covered: a rank of 6. that It was the longest. Ranks in Iil1es 12-20·)1{' based on th..
corresponding measUll's of durdtion In lines 1-5,7-9. and 11.
IRanks based on the averages of ranks of the follOWing series: GNP in 1958 doll",s (quarterly); final sales 1111958 dollars Iquarterly); personal income less transfer payments. ; %7 dollars;
manufacturingand trade s.lles. 1967 dollars: and retail s"les. ;967 dollars.
BRanks based 011 the averages of ranks of the follOWing serres: :otal CIVilian employment (household survey): employees on nonagricultural payrolls I,es••lblishment surv,"y'; persons en-
g.'ged in n"nagricultural activities (household survey'; empioy..e hours In nonagrrcultural establishments; ,lnd percent employed. total population.
hRanks based on the averages of ranks ci the spril's listed in notes f and g "bove and of the I"dustrial productlollindex. tot.l! number ofunemployed.•lnd un€'mpIOYlT1enl 'ateTABLE 6 Ranking of Sill Periods of Recession According to Size of Specific Cycle Peak-to-Trough Percent Changes
and levels at Specific Troughs, Selected Indicators, 1948-1975
Peaks and Troughs of Business Cycle Contractions·
Nov. 1948 July 1953 Aug. 1957 April 1960 Dec. 1969 Nov. 1973
Oct. 1949 May 1954 April 1958 Feb. 1961 Nov. 1970 March 1975
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent Change from Corresponding Specific Cycle Peak to
Corresponding Specific Cycle Trough
b
Index, 4 coincident indicatorsc -8.1 -8.0 -11.2 -4.6 -4.0 -12.5
2 GNP in 1972 dollars (Q) -1.4 -3.3 -3.2 -1.2 -1.1 -6.6
\,11 3 Final sales. 1972 dollars (Q) d -1.9 -1.7 d d 3 .., .... - .1
N 4 Personal income less transfers,
1972 dollars' -3.7 -2.6 -3.0 -0.9 -1.1 -6.8
5 Mfg. and trade sales, 1967 dol-
lars' -1.1 -6.0 -9.4 -4.1 -4.4 -12.5
6 Retail sales. 1967 dollars d -4.5 -4.5 -2.8 -1.4 -10.0
7 Industrial production index' -10.1 -9.1 -13.5 -8.6 -6.8 -15.3
8 Total civilian employment -2.4 -3.3 -2.3 -0.6 --0.3 -2.3
9 Employees on nonagricultural
payrolls' -4.2 -3.3 -4.2 -1.8 -1.1 -2.9
10 Persons engilged in non-
agricultural ac tivities -3.3 -3.2 -1.9 -0.5 -0.4 -2.3
11 Employee hours in non-
agricultural establishments -5.8 -4.9 -SA -1.8 -2.2 -,4.0
12 Total unemployed +106.9 ....132.4 +94.6 +41.6 +87.9 +88.813 Unemployment rate (% of
labor force)" +3.8 +3.4 +3.6 +1.9 +2.6 +3.9
14 Civilian employment. % of
population
C -1.7 -2.5 --2.2 -1.1 -'1.3 -2.2
15 Truck and rail traHic index n.a. n.a. -11.0 -8.5 -5.3 -13.4
Levels at Corresponding Specific Cycle Troughs!
16 Unemployment rate (% of
labor force) 7.0 5.9 7.4 7.0 6.0 8.7
17 Civilian employment, % of
population 54.5 53.5 54.0 54.1 55.4 55.2
18 Gap-potential less actual GNP
(Q), % n.a. 4.1 7.8 7.5 6.1 14.2
{,n Ranking According to Size of Percent Decline during .... Specific Cycle Contractions g ~
19 Index. 4 coincident indicators< 4 3 5 2 1 6
20 GNP in 1972 dollars (Q) 3 5 4 2 1 6
21 Personal income less transfers,
1972 dollars' 5 3 4 1 2 6
22 Mfg, and trade sales, 1967 dol-
lars' 1 4 5 2 3 6
23 Retail sales. 1967 dollars 1 41/2 41/2 3 2 6
24 Industrial production index' 4 3 5 2 1 6
25 Total civilian employment 5 6 31/2 2 1 31/2
26 Employees on nonagricultural
payrolls' S 1J2 4 5112 2 1 3
27 Persons engaged in non-
agricultural acti....ities 6 5 3 2 1 4TABLE 6 Concluded
Peaks and Troughs of Business Cycle Contractions'
Nov. 1948 July 1953 Aug. 1957 April 1960 Dec. 1969 Nov. 1973
Oct. 1949 May 1954 April 1958 Feb, 1961 Nov. 1970 March 1975
Line (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
28 Employee hours in non-
agricultural establishments 6 4 5 1 2 3
29 Unemployment rate
h 5 3 4 1 2 6
30 Civilian employment, % of
population 3 6 41/2 1 2 41/2
31 5 deflated aggregates' 3 41/2 41/2 1 1/2 1 1/2 6
32 5 employment series I 6 5 4 2 1 3
33 Ij Indicatorsk 3 5 4 1 1/2 1 1/2 6
\J1i ... Ranking According to Levels at Corresponding ..
Specific Cycle Troughs I
34 Unemployment rate 31/2 1 5 31/2 2 6
35 Civilian employment, % of
population 3 6 5 4 1 2
36 Cap·-potential less actual
GNP (Q), % n.a. 1 4 3 2 5
n.il. - not available
,.cdSampas In Table S.
haased on three-month aver.1gt's centered on the monlhs of speclilC cycle peaks and trollghs.
"Differences rather than percent changes are shown iar this series.
'Three-month averag'" centNed on the months of specific (yelp trough,.
~A rank oi 1 means thdt the cyclical decline is the ~mJJlestof those observed for the si\' rece~sions covered; a rank ot b. that It IS the largest Ranks.up based on the (orre:-oponcPng pnlflP~ In
h~:~~:d ~;o~ ~~~ :~~~~~t1[~. the large't rlSC' 10 unpmployment rate Ise(' Itne 13!.
'·1, Same.1S notes f. g. and h. respectively, in Table 5.
IL,n(' 3~ is bdSC'd on the corrt:spnnding entrif's in linC's "16 and 18. rank<,d from rawest to hlghpst; tlnd linC' 35, on thf' l'ntnr:s In Ime 17. ranked trom highe~t to IOWl.l~tRecession ilnd Reco\j(~ry of 1973-1976 515
er and milder thon in goods-producing industries" Since the former have ,1lso
been growing much faster (service industries' employment rlolJhled hetween
1948 and 1973; goods industries' employment rose hy only one-third), their
behavior now has a larger influence on total employment than it used to, and
has tended to reduce the length of its decline. As a result, the rank correlation
between the length of declines in l'mployment and their order in time is -0.8.
Declines in employment have been getting shorter. Unfortunately, this tenden-
cy has not carried over to unemployment, or at least has heen offset by oppo-
site tendencies. Increases in unemployment dunng recessions have, if any-
thing, been getting longer rather than shorter.
Business cycle contractions have been shorter (and expansions longed in the
past quarter century than they used to be in the long perspective of history.
The NBER reference chronology for the u.s. economy, which starts on a
monthly basis in 1854, covers twenty-two contractions in the period ending in
1945, and their average length was 21 months. More than half of them ex-
ceeded '16 months, the length of the 1973-1975 contraction, and the two
longest lasted 65 months (October 1873-March 1879) and 43 months (Aug-
ust 1929-March 1933). The 1973-1975 recession, though long in terms of
recent experience, was of less than average length when compared with all
previous U.S. recessions on record, The mean duration of the twenty-seven
contractions, 1857-1970, was 19 months.
Measures of the relative depth of business contractions are provided by the
percent changes from peak to trough of the corresponding specific cycles in
selected series (Table 6, lines 1_15).J7 For each indicator, these figures are
ranked by absolute size from the smallest (rank 1) to the largest (rank 6). The
ranks are listed in lines 19-30. For the sets of series (lines 31-33), we ran.ked
the average ranks of the components. In addition, the lowest (specific trough)
values in each of the recessions are recorded and ranked for the unemploy-
ment rate, percent of population employed, and GNP gap (lines 16-"18 and
33-35). In these instances the absolute level of the indicator at the trough is of
interest as a measure of the depth of recession.
The relative amplitude measures in Table 6, lines 1-15, suggest that the re-
cessions of 1960-1961 and 1969-1970 can be grouped together as the
mildest of the lot. The three earlier post-World War II recessions, which were
definitely more severe, form another group. The 1973-1975 business contrac-
tion was, by most measurements, the deepest of the six episodes covered, fol-
lowed by 1957-1958, 1953-1954, and 1948··1949. However, this conclusion
must be qualified in some important respects. Although the deflated aggre-
gates show much larger cyclical declines in 1973-1975 than during the other
recessions, the series in physical units display no such sharp and regular con-
trasts. Indeed, in terms of employment t~le last recession must be judged
milder than any of the three recessions between 1948 and 1958 (lines 8-12,
14, and 17).516
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The several rankings in Table 6, lines 19-35, are positively correlated with
one another, often do~ely. Thus the ranks based on the coincident index have
correlations ranging between 0.31 and 1.00 vis-a-vis ranks bas~d on real GNP,
real personal income less transfer payments, industrial production, the unem-
ployment rate, the average of the five deflated aggregates: and the ave~ag~ of
thirteen indicators. The corresponding rank correlations with the other Indica-
tors listed in Table 6 vary between 0.60 and 0.77, except for some of those in-
volving employment (lines 26,27,31, and 34), which vary between 0.14 and
0.54. The overall extent of agreement among the rankings, measured on a scale
ranging from zero (complete randomness) to 1 (perfect consistency, i.e., identi-
cal ranks), is 0.63 for lines 19-33 or 0.56 for lines 19-35.
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The divergence between the employment indicators and the other series
appears to reflect the trend mentioned above. According to the employment
series, declines have been becoming both smaller and shorter since 1948.
When the ranks of the six contractions are correlated with their order in time,
the coefficient for total civilian employment is -0.83, and those for nonfarm
employment and employee hours range from -0.66 to -0.73. In contrast, the
corresponding correlations for industrial production and real GNP are virtually
nil (+0.04 and +0.03, respectively). Declines in unemployment also fail to
show a trend; the correlation is -0.03.
One significant implication of the difference between the results for em··
ployment and unemployment is that job losing has become a smaller factor in
the rise in unemployment during recessions. The relative effect of job losing on
the unemployment rate can be measured approximately in the following man-
ner. The change in the unemployment rate is roughly equal to the difference
between the percent change in the labor force and the percent change in em-
ployment. During the first three postwar recessions (1948-1949, 1953-1954,
and 1957-1958) the decline in employment (net loss of jobs) exceeded the
rise in the labor force (net new entrants); during the last three (1960-1961,
1969-1970, and 1974-1975) the rise in the labor force exceeded the decline
in employment, that is, while the declines in employment became smaller, the
increases in the labor force became larger. The unemployment problem in re-
cessions has become less a matter of job losing and more a matter of finding
jobs for new entrants into the labor force. The acceleration in the growth of
the labor force, in turn, has been primarily a consequence of accelerated
growth in the size of the working age population; the rise in the overall labor
force participation rate has been a minor factor. The story is told in Table 7.
More dramatic than the percentages shown in the table are the numbers of
persons involved. During the first three recessions the number of unemployed
rose in the aggregate by 4.8 million, with 2.8 million accounted for by reduc-
tions in the number employed and 2.0 million, by increases in the I~bor force.
During the last three recessions the number of unemployed rose by 4.5 million,
but reductions in employment accounted for only 0.7 million and increases inTABLE 7 Relative Importance of Job Loss in Changes in Unemployment, 1948-1949 to 1974-1975
(annual data)
Percent Change in Change in
Labor Force Percent
Civilian Minus Change in Accounted
Noninst. Labor Civilian Change in Unemployment for by
Population Force Employment Employment Rate Job Loss·
l1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1948-1949 +1.0 +1.1 -1.2 +2.3 +2.1 52
1953-1954 +1.0 +1.0 -1.8 +2.8 +2.6 64
l"n .. 1957-1958 +1.1 +1.1 -1.6 +2.7 +2.5 59 ....
1960-1961 +1.3 +1.2 0.0 +1.2 +1.2 0
1969-1970 +1.7 +2.5 +0.9 +1.6 +1.4 --64
1974-1975 +1.7 +1.8 -1.3 +3.1 +2.9 42
"Column 3. signs reversed, divided by column 4, times 100.TABLE 8 Ranking of Six Periods of Recession According to Size of Business Cycle Peak-to-Trough Percent Changes
and Levels at Business Troughs, Selected Indicators, 1948-1975
Peaks and Troughs of Business Cycle Contractions'
Nov. 1948 July 1953 Aug. 1957 April 1960 Dec. 1969 Nov. 1973
Oct. 1949 May 1954 April 1958 Feb. 1961 Nov. 1970 March 1975
Line (1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Percent Change from Business Cycle Peak to Business Cycle Troughb
1 Index, 4 coincident indicators' -7.8 -8.0 -10.8 -4.6 -3.2 -12.5
2 GNP in 1972 dollars (Q) -1.4 -2.7 -2.5 -0.3 -0.6 -6.6
3 Final sales, 1972 dollars (9) +1.3 -1.8 -1.1 +0.9 -0.2 -3.2
VI 4 Personal income less transfers, -' co 1972 dollars' -2.8 -2.5 -3.0 -0.2 -0.1 -6.9
5 Mfg. and trade saies, 1967 dol-
lars' -1.3 -5.0 -7,6 -3.6 -2.9 -12.5
6 Retail sales, 1967 dollars +-l.4d -0.5 -4.5 -2.8 +0.6 --5,7
7 Industrial production index' -8.5 -9.1 -12.6 -6.1 -5.8 -15.:
8 Total civilian employment -1.5 -2.2 -2.3 +0.3 -0.2 -1.4
9 Employees on nonagricultural
payrolls' -4.1 -2.9 -3.8 -1.8 -0.9 -1,7
10 Persons engaged in non-
agricultural activities -0.7 -2.2 -1.8 0.0 -0.1 -1,2
11 Employee hours in non-
agricultural establishments -5,2 -3,9 -4,8 -1,9 -2,2 -3,6
12 Total unemployed, civilian
labor force +85,9 + 124.4 +71,2 +31,5 "'62,8 ... 78:113 Unemployment rate, tota/" +3.1 +3.2 +2.9 +1.6 +2.2 +3.5
14 Civilian employment, %
of population· -1.3 -1.7 -1.7 -0.5 -1.0 -2.1
15 Truck and rail traffic index n.a. n.a. -10.0 -6.4 -1.6 -13.4
Leveis at Business Cycle Troughs
f
16 Unemployment rate, total 7.0 5.8 7.2 6.8 5.9 8.4
17 Civilian employment, % of
population 54.5 53.8 54.1 54.4 55.7 55.2
18 Gap-potential less actual GNP
(Q),% n.a. 4.1 7.8 7.5 6.1 14.1
Ranking According to Size of Percent Decline during
Business Cycle Contractionss
{,/l 19 Index, 4 coincident indicatorsc 3 4 5 2 1 6 ...
1.0 20 GNP in 1972 dollars (Q) 3 5 4 1 2 6
21 Personal income less transfers,
1972 dollars' 4 3 5 2 1 6
22 Mfg. and trade sales, 1967 dol-
lars· 1 4 5 3 2 6
23 Retail sales 1967 dollars 1 3 5 4 2 6
24 Industrial production index· 3 4 5 2 1 6
25 Total civilian employment 4 5 6 1 2 3
26 Employees on nonagricultural
payrolls· 6 4 5 3 1 2
27 Persons engaged in non-
agricultural activities 3 6 5 1 2 4
28 Employee hours in non-
agricultural establishments 6 4 5 1 2 3TABLE 8 Concluded
Peaks and Troughs of Business Cycle Contractions~
Nov. 1948 July 1953 Aug. 1957 April 1960 Dec. 1969 Nov. 1973
Oct. 1949 May 1954 April 1958 Feb. 1961 Nov. 1970 March 1975
Line (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
29 Unemployment rateh 4 5 3 1 2 6
30 Civilian employment. %of
population 3 41/2 41/2 1 2 6
31 5 deflated aggregates' 1 1/2 4 5 3 1 1/2 6
32 Semployment series J 4 5 6 1 2 :3
33 13 indicators
k 3 4 5 1 2 6
lJ1
f',j
Ranking According to Levels at Business Cycle Troughs' =
34 Unemployment rate 4 1 5 3 2 6
3S Civilian employment. % of
population 3 6 5 4 1 2
36 Gap-potential less actual GNP n.a. 1 4 3 2 S
n.a. : not ,wall,lOI".
-Denote!o ~f:>rie~ inclurh·d in composite ind~·xes. Iint·~ 1 i:lnd 19.
1I.c,dS.1m(· il~ in T~bl(' 5.
hB~('d on three-month ave'rages n'nterf'd on the monlh~ of busmp~ ... '- yrle peaks .lnd troug.h~.
".g. Sam" a, In Table 6.
fTrree-month (1v('ragp~«('ntprpd on. thea months of bLJsine~scycle ttoughs,
'-/. Sam" as notes f, g. ,lnd h. respectlvf>ly. In Table S.
1 50me as ,n Tabl(' 6.Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 521
the labor force, for 3.8 million.
The measures in Table 6 reflect the relative amplitudes of specific cycle
movements associated with business recessions. The results give full recogni-
tion to the timing differences among the indicators and measure the full cycli-
cal swing in each indicator. In Tabie 8 we compare the size of movements that
occurred strictly during the period of each recession, that is, the relative
changes between the business cycle, rather than the corresponding specific
cycle, turning points. The percent change figures in Table 8 equal their coun-
terparts in Table 6 whenever the specific cycle turns in the given series coin-
cide with the business cycle turns, but this happens only about 15 percent of
the time. Otherwise, the amplitude measures in Table 8 are smaller in absolute
terms than the corresponding entries in Table 6, but the differences are often
minor.
The correlations among the rankings in Table 8, lines 19-35,are positive and
in many cases quite high. Specifically, choosing once again the coincident in-
dex as the reference series, we find that its ranks are exactly the same as those
of the industrial production index and closely correlated (r, ~ 0.9) with the
ranks of real GNP, real personal income, the percent of population employed,
and the groups of five deilated aggregates and thirteen indicators. The corre-
sponding correlations with the real sales aggregates, total nonfarm employ-
ment, and the unemployment rate vary between 0.71 and 0.83; those with the
other employment and unemployment series, between 0.26 and 0.66. The
coefficients of concordance (W) are 0.63 (lines 19-33) and 0.57
(lines 19-35).39
Since the amplitude measures in Table 8 use common fixed reference
periods for the business recessions being compared, they are presumably less
affected by the dispersion of cyclical timing of the different series than are the
amplitude measures in Table 6 which relate to complete specific cycle contrac-
tions that vary in duration for each recession they match. As seen in Table 5,
the rankings of the duration figures show some iarge disparities. Consequently,
one might expect a closer agreement among the reference cycle than among
the specific cycle measures of the relative depth of business recessions. In fact,
the rank correlations based on changes between business cycle turns (Table 8)
are mostly higher than those based on changes between specific cycle turns
(Table 6), but on balance the difference between the two sets is small.
Averages of the ranks in both tables indicate that the six business recessions
can be arrayed in the following order from mildest to most severe: 1969-1970,
1960-1961,1948-·1949,1953-1954,1957-1958, and 1973-1975. However,
some of the distinctions involved are marginal and based on partly conflicting
evidence; e.g., while the 1960-1961 and 1969-1970 recessions were definite-
ly milder than the rest, it is difficult to establish firmly their relative position vis-
'a-vis one another. Also, it should be noted that our amplitude measures are not
adjusted for any special events that occurred in the vicinity of business cycle522
VirlOf larnowill and C('o!frpy Ii. Moof!'
turning points (except inasmlH h as our lise of the three-month. aVf'rag:'\ at
p(,i1b ,Ifld troughs reduces the influenn' of such events). It IS diffICult to ld(~n­
tify such fartors and eliminate their effefts, and attempts to do so may wPlI
result in a nd imn'ase rather than reduction of measureml'nt error. 1hIS ap-
plies, in particular, to tlw two events that iue known to have coinci(~ed with
reference turns: the major strikes of Octoher 1949 and November 1970. A
simple adjustment-excluding the strike months from the data-has serious
disadvantages and, in any event, would not significantly alter our conelu-
5ions.
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The larger a cyclical movement (expansion or contraltion), the more wide-
spread it usually is, and vice versa. Thus a diffusion index, which shows
monthly the percent of components of an economic aggregate that are ex-
panding, is as a rule positively correlated with the rate of chang(~ in the same
aggregate. But the correlation can hreak down when, for example, there are
sharp out localized changes in the activity, or when the changes are small out
widespread. Mon'over, a diffusion index can be computed for groups of series
for which no aggregate exists. Hence, Ine size and scope of economif change
are two distinct aspects worth studying both separately and jointly.
In the present context, diffusion inc/exes based on series with roughly foinci-
dent timing are of particular intcrest. The indexes for nonagricultural employ·
ment 00 and 172 industries) and industrial production (24 industries) record
the percent of industries experiencing declining employment and output dur-
ing each business mntraction.
41 The larger these proportions are, and the
longer they persist, the greater the diffusion or scope of the contraction. In
each of the six recessions of the post-World War II period, the percent of in-
dustries with falling employment (measured over six-month spans) rcached
75 percent or more and stayed at these high levels for a number of months; at
no other times during the period did this happen. Much the same statement
can be made about the diffusion index for industrial production. Thus a good
mea"-.ure of the scope of a business contraction is the average percent declin-
~':lg (d) over the interval during which that percent exceeded 75. In addition to
d, we also examine the maximum perccnt of industries declining during any
month related to a given recession (max d).
Table 9 shows that employment and production declines were least wide,·
spread in the recession of 1969-1970; that tl1(' recessions of .,960-1961 and
1953-1954 were about the same in scope; and that the recessions of
1973-1975,1957-1958, and 1948-'1949 wcre the most widely diffused. Very
few industries were left unscathed by these recessions.
Patterns of Recession and Recovery
The course, speed, scope, and duration of contractions and expansions vary
from one business cycle to another according to any acceptable measure ofRecession and Recovery of 1973-1976 523
economic activity. Moreover, different measures suggest different rates and
patterns ofcyclical change for any particular episode. Comparisons of develop-
ments during corresponding phases of general business fluctuations must
therefore be designed and interpreted with great caution and respect for his-
torical diversity. They are also rather severely limited by the availability of
reasonably accurate data. Yet it is possible to make such comparisons for
several important economic variables overa number of successive business cy-
cles whose chronology is well established, and the results are instructive for
both the regularities and irregularities they disclose.
Our analysis covers ten major economic indicators, goes back to the 1920s,
and is divided into two sections. The first deals with developments before and
during business contractions-specifically, the period beginning 12 months
before and ending 18 months after each business cycle peak covered. The sec-
ond deals with recoveries, and spans the period beginning 6 months before
and ending 24 months after each business cycle trough covered.41
Recession Patterns
In Chart6 each of seven selected indicators is converted to a percent change
from its level at the business cycle peak, so that the standingsat peak form a
common base (= 100) for a set of business contraction patterns. For each of
four other indicators Chart6 shows two analogous graphs using absolute dif-
ferences instead of percent changes. Those series are the unemployment rate,
the inflation rate (based on the consumer price index), change in business in-
ventories in constant dollars, and interest rates on bank loans to business. All
series covered are identified on the charts and in the descriptive notes below.
The data for the latest recession are plotted for each consecutive month or
quarter, and so are the median patterns for the five business cycles
1948-1969. To avoid overly complicated graphs, the data for all individual cy-
cles before the latest one are plotted only every six months. The 1948-1969
cycles are represented by dots, the earlier cycles by crosses.
GNP in Constant Dollars In the year before the peak and the first two quar-
ters of the recession, the pattern for the past cycle deviates little from the me-
dian 1948-1969 pattern, but further on the differences widen, reflecting the
greater severity and longer duration of the 1973 contraction (the dates used in
this section refer throughout to the year in which the given cyclical movement
began). The 1929 and1937 contractions stand out clearly as the deepestones;
the former decline was initially smaller than the latter, but it accelerated
sharply in its second year and lasted much longer.
Industrial Production Here the sharp decline during the 1973-1975 business
contraction was relatively short and occurred late; hence, the deviations from
the median pattern are large. Only four other declines were deeper and lasted
at least as long: 1920,1929, "1937, and 1945.TABLE 9 Ranking of Six Periods of Recession by Diffusion of Cyclical Decline, 1948-1975




























































Maximum Percent of Industries Declining (max d)'
90.0 86.7 88.3 81.7 80.0 900
n.a. n.a. na. 80.1 79.7 869
91.7 91.7 97.9 91.7 79.7 91.7
Ranking According to d and max dIJ1
N
IJ1
7 d 4 3 5 2 1 6
8 max d 5.5 3 4 2 1 5,5
172 industries
9 d n.a. n.a. n.a. 2 1 3
10 max d n.a, n.a. n.a. 2 1 3
Industrial production
24 industries
11 d 4 2 6 3 '1 5
12 max d 3.5 3.5 6 3.5 1 3.5
n,a, - not available,
'Same as on Table 4.
bFigures in parentheses show the number of consecutive months when 75 percent or more ot mdustries were declirllng; the preceding dIS the actual average ovpr thosp months, S(,l~ text.
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Employees on Nonagricultural Payrolls This series shows a larger and more
continuous rise in 1973-1974 than the industrial production index, and a
smaller decline in 1974-1975. This is partly due to the broader coverage of em-
ployment, which includes services. On the whole, however, the patterns for
the two series are similar.
Unemployment Rate (inverted) Absolute changes in the percent of the labor
force represented by the jobless have been quite small in the last year of ('x-
pansion (except before the 1937 peakl. During the first nine months after the
peak, the rate of unemployment increased much more slowly in ·1973-1974
than in the other contractions, but during the next nine months the situation
was drastically reversed: the 1974-1975 rise in the jobless rate was larger than
in any recession since 1940. However, it was clearly nut caused by an
unusually large decline in employment, since the latter, in fact, was relatively
small.
Consumer Price Index The graph shows cyclical movements in the rate of in-
flation, which is represented by the percent change in the CPI over six-month
spans at annual rates. Large cyclical declines in this measure mark several hIS-
torical episodes, particularly the huge deflation of 1920-1921 and the smaller
deflations follOWing the business cycle peaks in 1929, 1937, and 1948. More
recently, of course, upward trends have been predominant, but the chart
shows that declines in the rate of inflation occurred in every recession be-
tween 1948 and 1969. In contrast, the pattern for 1973-1975 shows a sharp
rise during most of the recession; only in the last six months of the recession
did a substantial decline begin.
531532 Victor Zarnowitz ,md Cl'offrcy H. Moore
Sales of Retail Stores in Constant [)ol/,m Thi~ ~('rif's shows a long and sharp
decline in 1973-1974, beginning well abovp and ending well below the me-
dian 1948-1969 pattern. Indeed, the decline was larger than in 1929-19.31
and was exceeded only by the 1937-1938 contraction. However, the data
before and after World War II are not strictly comparable.
4l
Business Capital Outla)'s in Constant Dol/ars Real investment in plant and
equipment declined late und at first slowly in 1974, holding up just about as
well as it did in the mild 1970 recession. it was only in the second half of the re-
cession that real capital spending by business fell at an accelerated rate.
Although the decline then was large, it was no larger than in some of the earlier
post-World War II contractions. Of course, nothing in the more recent U.S.
economic history came even dose to the catastrophic slumps of investment
during the two contractions of the 1930s, as the chart shows.
Change in Business Inventories in Constant Dol/ar) Unlike fixed investment,
business inventory investment in real terms had a sharp downward trend
throughout the 1973-1975 recession. Compared to the medi,1n pattern,
1948-1969, and to all the other episodes shown, the 1973-1975 decline was
exceptionally largp. Since the patterns are expressed in billions of dollars in
constant prices, the growth of the economy needs to be taken into account in
evaluating the differences between the earlier and later cycles.
Bank Rates on Short-Term Business Loans The 1973-1975 pattern shows by
far the largest swing in interest rates on record, as indicated by the comparison
with the median 1948-1969 pattern, which lies close to the base line, and by
the similar concentration of most entries for the individual cycles. However,
the cyclical movements of bank rates were also large in 1969-1971. Clearly, in-
terest rates have varied much more widely during the past decade than in
earlier times.
The average of interest rates charged by banks on commercial loans is a lag-
ging indicator, especially at troughs. In '1974 the lag at the business peak was
particularly pronounced and very similar to the lag in the inflation rate. Indeed,
a comparison of this graph with that for the rate of change in the CPI reveals a
striking parallelism of the 1971 patterns as well as some more minor similarities
for the earlier cycles (including the 1948-1969averages). This positive associa-
tion has a familiar twofold theoretical explanation: (i) The observed (nominal)
market interest rates tend to increase (decrease) in times when inflation (defla-
tion) is anticipated. To the extent that lenders and borrowers agree on the ex-
pected rate of increase in prices, they are also apt to agree on the rorrespond-
ing inflation premium to be included in the interest rates. (ji) The expected rate
of change in prices is positively related to the observed path of actual rates of
change in the price level.
As noted before, however, price expectations adjusted to the large swing in
the inflation rates only with a lag and incompletely, that is, much oi the infla-
tion was unanticipated. The amplitude of the interest rate pattern is consider-Recession and Remvery of 1973-1976 533
ably smaller than that of the inflation pattern. Furthermore, bank interest rates
(and rates of return in genera" have other determinants as well: they would
vary even it no change in the inflation rate were expected. Thus interest rates
rose to high peak levels in the first three quarters of1974 partly because busi-
ness investment in current dollars continued strong and so, consequently, did
the overall demand for credit.
Corporate Profits in Cons/ant Dollars In an attempt to measure cyclical
changes in real profits, we use the latest data on corporate profits from produc-
tion (i.e., with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments) de-
flated by the GNP implicit price index44 The decline in profits so measured
started early-a year before the reference peak date of 1973:4-but was ini-
tially slow and vacillating. In 1974, however, real profits slumped sharply, much
as they did in 1923-1924 and far worse than in the other contractions covered
except for the debacles of the 1930s.
Index of Leading Indicators The decline in this series started five months
before the November 1973 business cycle peak, a shorter iead than that indi-
cated by the median 194B-1969 pattern. For about a year thereafter, the
movement of the index was close to the median, but then the pattern for
1974-1975 shows an accelerated decline which is in sharp contrast to the rise
in the median pattern. In terms of these comparisons, it is evident that the
1973-1975 contraction in the leading indicators was both relatively long and
deep.
Recovery Patterns
Chart 7 is analogous in form ar.d content to Chart 6, but it is designed to show
the behavior of the same series immediately before and during the business
recoveries. It should be noted that the data plotted for most series start from a
zero base line at the business cycle trough, and show changes from that trough
level computed as a percent of the level at the preceding business cycle peak.
The reason is that percents computed in the usual way, with the trough level
as the base, are apt to be very large if the trough is very low. For this arithmetic
reason alone, deep recessions are apt to be followed by "rapid" recoveries.
Moreover, since there is great variation in the depth of recessions but less vari-
ation in the height of booms, greater comparability among recoveries is
achieved by using the peak level as the base for calculating percent change
during recovery45 The same data can be used to show how far below or above
the preceding peak level the indicator stands at any given point during the
recovery by comparing the rise after the trough with the preceding decline
from peak to trough. The charts as plotted, however, do not show this.
The follOWing observations Sl.'m up the main lessons from this graphical
analysis.
GNP in Constant Dollars The path of this series in the current recovery re-CHART 7 Recovery Patterns, Eleven Indicators
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535CHART 7 (continued)
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536CHART 7 (continued)


















c 25 '" ~























































'" ';; o -3 ......------'---------'-------l----__-J. ---I
























































sembles closely but is slightly below the average 1949-1970 expansion pat-
tern. The most rapid recoveries followed the 1938 and 1949 recessions, stimu-
lated in part by World War II and the Korean War. The recovery from the 1933
depression was the slowest, and initially the recovery from the 1970 recession
was relatively slow.
Industrial Production The configuration for the 1975 recovery resembles
broadly that of real GNP arid leads to the same conclusion: that the expansion
in industrial production in its first two years has lagged slightly behind the ma-
jority of its historical counterparts. However, the 1975-1976 curve lies very
close to the median pattern.
Employees on Nonagricultural Payrolls The 1975 recovery pattern for em-
ployment shows a later upturn and a somewhat slower rise during the first two
years than the median pattern. It is consistent with the image of a relatively
moderate but steady rise in economic activity.
Unemployment Rate (inverted) The reduction in the unemployment rate has
been significantly slower in 1975-1976 than in the previous recoveries
covered, except for 1970 and 1945-1946-which, however, was in many re-
spects a very special episode. The slow reduction in unemployment during the
first year of the recovery cannot be attributed to a slow rise in employment,
since the rise in employment was then closeto the average of previous recov-
eries. Rather, it reflects the continuing, unusually strong growth of the labor
force and the concentration of employment gains in service industries where,
as noted before, labor turnover rates tend to be especially high. The turn-
around to higher unemployment rates during the "pause" in the second half of
1976 has been relatively pronounced, though not without some precedents in
past expansions.
539TABLE 10 Economic Growth Rates and Changes in, the Rate of Inflation





















1 March 1933 5.2 -9.5 3.9 13.4
2 April'1958 .1.6 4.1 2.4 -1.7
J November 1970 5.7 .1.0 3..1 -1 ..1
4 March 1975 6.(J 8.6 5.7 -2.9
5 February 1% 1 6.1 1.7 1.1 -06
6 May1954 6.6 0.2 n.7 0..1
7 November 1927 6.6 -2.9 00 29
8 July 1924 9.0 -2.4 2.6 .1.0
9 June 1938 10.3 -3.7 2.1 5.8
10 july 1921 11.0 -12.9 0.3 13.2
11 Octuber 1949 "11.3 -18 12.0 13.8
50URCE: National Rure<1u of hunumrc R""\HCh. In,
aperfent rate computed on basI' ofGNP al precpdlng hus,"e~s (y(I.. pt'ak
bChange oyer six-month sp,ln, seasonally adjusted ,lt ,lnnlhll ratl'. I'lacedat l'nd (Of ~P,ln
cThrl'P-month a\"er,lge. (<'nteTed on trough m,,"l~
Consumer Price Index The recovery patterns tell us that during 1920-1950
the rate of change in the (PI registered large increases during the two years
follOWing each trough. (It is well to recall that the standings at troughs in this
period, except for 1945, were all negative; i.e., the (PI was jailing at the end of
each of the six recessions in 1921-1938 and in 1949.) In the last quarter cen-
tury, however, the prevailing inflation tended to moderate somewhat in the
initial stages of the recoveries. The median 1949-1970 pattern lies below the
base (trough standing = 0) line. The 1975 pattern shows a significantly greater
decline in the inflation rate than was achieved in any of the recoveries ot
1949-1970, but one must remember that the 1975·-1976 reductions started
from unusually high levels of inflation.
A close comparison of the patterns for the rate of change in the (PI and for
GNP in constant dollars suggests that a relationship exists between the average
rate of recovery in output and the concurrent change in the inflation rate.
Table 10 illustrates this association for the first eighteen months of eleven busi-
ness recoveries in the period 1921-197646 In the six most vigorous recoveries
(lines 6-11) inflation accderated, the more so the greater the increase in real
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GNP. In four of the five recent recoveries with below-median growth rates in
real GNP (lines 2-5) the rate of inflation fell, as indicated by the negative en-
tries in column 4" The only strong exception is the recovery from the
1929-1933 depression (line 1), which was initially sluggish but saw'adrastic re-
versal in the price level movement, from a steep decline at the March 1933
business cycle trough to a fairly large rise eighteen months later. However,
special factors promoted autonomous wage and price rises in this period, nota-
bly legislative measures such as the National Industrial Recovery Act passed in
June 1933, and the rise in costs may have retarded recovery. (For a detailed
analysis of cyclical changes in the 1930s, see Roose 1954, especially chaps. 3,
4,8, and 9, and Friedman and Schwartz 1963, especially pp. 493-496'> When
the 1933 recovery is excluded, the correlation between the ranks of entries in
columns 1 and 4 of Table 10 is nearly perfect (I', = 0.%); when it is included,
the correlation is still positive but much lower (I', = 0.56).47
Sales ofRetail Stores in Constant Dol/aI'S On the whole, the rise in this series
during 1975-1976 was fairly close to the 1949-1970 average.
Business Capital Outlays in Constant Dol/aI'S These expenditures have been
unusually sluggish in the first two years of the current recovery. The 1975 pat-
tern lies below all the preceding recoveries.
Change in Business Inventories in Constant Dol/aI'S The 1973-1974 decline
in real inventory investment, the largest since the 1930s, was followed by the
strongest rebound. The inventory decline and recovery were not only large in
absolute size but also relative to the change in total GNP. They accounted for
56 percent of the decline in real GNP during the recession and for 30 percent
of the first year's recovery.
Bank Rates on SlJort-Term Business Loans Movements in this series during
the 1975-1976 busip.ess recovery continued to resemble those in the inflation
rate (CPI), as our graphs demonstrate, but again with smaller amplitude. The
patterns for both variables show peaks about six months before the business
cycle trough of March 1975 and downward trends during the first year or more
of recovery. The decline in interest rates during this recovery has been
unusually large and long by historical standards, according to our comparisons,
although bank rates behaved rather similarly in the recovery that followed the
previous (1970) recession. The 1933-1935 period provides another example of
declining interest rates during a recovery. Here the evident reason was the
continuing depression of investment and bank credit demand, since there was
asharp reversal in the rate of change of prices. In the current recovery the slug-
gishness of investment and ample supply of internal funds contributed to the
decline in interest rates, reinforcing the effects of reduced rates of inflation.
Corporate Profits in Conslant Dol/ars The recovery pattern of real profits
shows a sharp rise in the first two quarters of the current recovery and oscilla-
tion with a mild upward drift thereafter. The 1975-"1976 curve lies above the
median 1949-1970 pattern. Only in the recoveries from the deep troughs of542 Victor Z.1rnow;lI and Ceofffl'Y H. IvtoOfe
1933 and]9JB have rpal profib shown larger rplativp iIKf('aWS tl1<ln in
1975-1976, but in all three cases the preccding dec!inl's WPle Pxccptlorhtlly
I;\rge also.
Index of Leading Indicators The pattern of this series, which rose almost con-
tinuously from Feowilry 1975 through Deccmbpr '1976, shows only small devi-
dtions (in either direction} from the path of the median ·1949-1970 expansion.
In sum, the comparisons of cyclical patterns disclos£' several peculiarities of
recent developments, the most important being the innedse in the rate of in-
flation during the early phase of the recession and its decline during the early
phase of recovery. The re,Ktion can be described ,IS an unusually long lag. The
movement of interest rates was remarkdbly large, ancllagged in a manner simi-
lar to that of the ratp of price change. Huge swings downward in 1974 and up-
ward in 1975 occurred in real net corporatp profits and in real inventory invest-
ment. Business capital outlays in constant dollars declined late in this recession
and rose late and with disappointing sluggishnl'ss in the current rerovery.
APPENDlh:: ON SOME PROBLEMS IN THE ESTIMATION
OF REAL OUTPUT
Comprehensive series in constant dollars show unusual divergencies of move-
ment from series in physical units during '1973-1974. In particular, real GNP
declined throughout 1974, whereas the indexes of industrial production and
nonagricultural employment declined decisively only after June and Septem-
ber '1974, respectively. The declines in real GNP were unusually large relative
to those in previous recessions whereas those in industrial production and in
employment Were not especially large. This has led some contemporary ob-
servers to suspect "overdeflation"- that errors in the derivation of the
constant-dollar values of national income and expenditure have been not only
unusually large, but also systematic, in the direction of biasing downward such
data as real GNP, real retail sales, etc. (see Okun 1974, especially p.504, and
Moore 1975).
One poss'ible source of such errors could be that some prices reflected in
current outlays and shipments are set by contract several weeks or months
before. If current rather than past prices are used to adjust the current-dollar
series, then in a period of generally rising prices overdeflation will result. Ot
course, escalator clauses in contracts would tend to prevent this and might
even lead to underdeflation errors if the escalated prices accepted in the con-
tracts exceeded the current prices. However, the speedup of inflation in
1973-1974 was, we believe, largely unanticipated; therefore, for some time
during that period overdeflation would seem on balance more likely.Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 543
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To resolve this empirical issue, then, it becomes important, especially in
times of rap!d ch,mges in price levels, to knuw the dating of contract prices and
whether and how such prices were escalated. This is by now well recognized,
but information on these matters is still fragmentary. According to a current
study by the NBER, the deficiencies of the wholesale price data are such that a
full assessment of. and proper adjustments to, the present deflation procedures
cannot really be made. A sample of WPI reports indicates that the index con-
sists of an almost equal mixture of order prices of capital goods and industrial
materials bought on contract for future delivery and of shipment prices at
which the past output of the various goods has been sold. The lags between
new orders and shipments, according to the BlS price reporters, are substan-
tial: more than half fall in the range of one to six months for both order and
shipment prices, but are generally shorter for those products represented by
shipment prices than for those represented by order prices (see Ruggles 1977,
p.I-22l.
Contract prices are particularly important for types of output ordered for
future delivery. Capital goods are largely of this type, and price indexes for
such goods are on the whole weak.
48 The WPI prices of capital goods for a
given month are as a rule those at which current sales are made (new orders
are taken), not prices for deliveries in that month. The estimates of investment
in equipment, however, are based on deliveries in that month. They represent
not only sales in the same month but also sales made in earlier months at the
then prevailing prices. Before 1974 current prices were used to deflate invest·
ment in producers' durable equipment, in effect, deliveries for a given month
were adjusted largely by the price index of orders taken in the same month. In
1974, the procedure was substantially improved: the deflators now used are
weighted averages of current and past prices, based on estimates of the typical
time interval between the sale and delivery dates. The estimates of the order-
delivery lags are derived from average ratios of unfilled orders to shipments lUI
5), differentiated by type of equipment (the ratio is expressed as the number of
months of current shipments represented by the current backlog of unfilled or-
dersl. The new procedure has been extended back to 1958 (see Rottenberg
and Donahoe 1975, pp.20-23, 28l.
Adeficiency of the revised approach is that it uses fixed lags between orders
and delivery, whereas the actual lags vary with changes in the size and compo-
sition of the orders backlog. During business expansions, when rates of
capacity utilization rise, delivery lags tend to lengthen; during contractions,
they become shorter. The U/S ratios show, in fact, large cyclical movements
(but often with rather irregular timing, notably long leads at business peaks and
long lags at troughs). For example, the ratio for durable goods manufacturers
declined from 3.3 to 2.6 months and averaged 3.0 months in 1968-1972, the
period used to provide the first approximations to the price lags incorporated
in the new deflators for equipment. However, it then rose from 2.7 to544 Victor Zarnowitl ,1Od Ceoffrey II. Moore
3.6 months in 1973-1974 and fell hack to 2.8 months hy mid-197G. The use of
fixed (average) instead of cydic,1l1y variable U/S ratios and l'~til1ldtpd delivery
periods would presumably make the price lags built into the equipment defla-
tors too short in times of strong pressures of demand on capacity and too long
otherwise. If so, some over- and underdeflation biases, respectively, would
result. but their timing and size seem very difficult to establish short of a de·
tailed analysis of the data and procedures used.
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Another possibility is that the use of input rather than output prices in
deflating expenditures could bias the results. The bias would be in the direc-
tion of overdeflation if output prices rose less than input prices, in the direction
of underdeflation in the opposite case. In the long run, because of productivity
increases not accounted for in the input cost indexes, overdeflation would be
expected. Of the private-sector outlays, those on structures are particularly af-
fected. 50 The problem also applies to the entire government sector, where
output measures are generally lacking and productivity estimation is especially
difficult. 51 What statistical evidence there is, which pertains solely to the feder-
al government, suggests that product!vity has been rising. Hence the growth in
government output in the national accounts may be underestimated.
In the short run the analytical situation is more complicated, however. It is
often uncertain what kind of error would be generated by the use of input
prices as deflators in a particular episode, and indeed whetherany errors of sys-
tematic nature would necessarily result. In addition to an upward secular trend,
productivity is subject to occasional short-term disturbances and cyclical varia-
tion which typically include declines late in expansion and early in contraction.
Profit margins, which are a factor differentiating output prices from input
prices, show strong procyclical movements, usually also with leads. notably at
peaks. Relative prices of individual input and output categories vary consider-
ably in ways not conforming to any simple or stable pattern.52 Our concern
here is not with any long-run biases which would affect recent and earlier years
alike, but rather with measurement problems that could cause serioLls distor-
tions in the statistical picture specifically for the 1973-1976 interval. From this
point of view, the principal difficulty created by the use of input price deflators
probably is their failure to reflect the unusually sharp decline in profit margins
in this period. In these circumstances, actual prices received would not rise as
much as input prices, and overdeflation would result.
Another serious estimation problem during this period occurred in the drea
of inventory investment-its accounting as well as economic aspects. In times
of rapid changes in the inflation rate, it is particularly difficult to evaluate the
change in business inventories (CBIl, a highly volatile component of GNP. In
current-dollar GNP accounts, this component is measured at current replace··
ment costs. To do this, starting from the reported inventory book values, re-
quires a separation of the stock valued by the last-in first-out (LIFO) aClOunting
method from the stock valued by the first-in first-out (FIFO) method, for theRecession ilnd Recovery of 1973-1976 545
two methods produce different dollar figures for costs of sales, values of inven-
tory, and profits in any situation where prices of the goods sold from stock
change over time.'3
When prices of goods helel in stock rise, the appreciation is counted as prof-
its in the FIFO but not in the LIFO system. Commerce estimates of the invento-
ry valuation adjustment (IVA) serve to correct reported profits for such unrea-
lized and partly spurious "paper profits" from higher inventory prices. IVA
represents the difference between the change in book value of inventories, as
reported by business firms using a mixture of accounting methods, and the
change in inventories at current replacement cost, as compLited by the Com-
merce Department from the business inventory reports. in 1974, the sharply
rising prices resulted in an unprecedented large IVA>4
The inventory profits which accrue under FIFO are taxable, while under LIFO
such profits do not accrue (except for major inventory liquidations when prof-
its from higher prices are realized-but such realizations can be avoided or
postponed). Hence, many companies were shifting toward the use of LIFO
under the impact of the high and rising inflation rates in 1973-1974.5\
The change in business inventories, like other expenditure components of
GNP, is estimated in both current and constant dollars. The price indexes used
to deflate the inventories are components of the wholesale price index (WPI)
corresponding to the commodity composition of the given industry's stock. For
FIFO inventories, the deflators are based on average prices for the current and
preceding months, the number oi months being approximately equal to the in-
ventory turnover period. Increases in LIFO stocks reflect increases in physical
volume valued at prices of recent acquisitions; so they are deflated by price in-
dexes for the current period. However, a reduction in the volume of inventory
means that withdrawals exceed acquisitions, and withdrawals can then be
stated only in terms of prices of those prior periods in which the sold goods
entered the stock, not in terms of Current replacement costs. Thus decreases in
LIFO stocks reflect decreases in physical volume valued at earlier prices; hence,
they are deflated by applying ratios of the base-period prices to the prices of
the acquisition period (see Rottenberg 1974; Herman, Donahoe, and Hin-
richs 19761.
Early estimates of the inventory change in 1973,particularly in the latter part
of the year, and '1974:1 were beset by very large underestimation errors, as in-
dicated by the major upward revisions of July 1974. This has been attributed in
large measure to "a rather unique and unfortunate combination of events. The
late reports and introduction of a new sample are infrequent events and the re-
visions in book values were all in one direction" (Young 1974, p. 38).% But it is
recognized that more basic problems exist.s7 Data on the commodity composi-
tion of inventories and the applicable price indexes are far from adequate. In-
formation on inventory accounting methods available in 1973 was quite ob~o­
lete. Asystem of mon itoring the changes in inventory valuation and reporting
methods was instituted by BEA in 1974.546
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Supposp thill a company shifts to LIFO a«~llmting but thi,,is not reported
and not known to the Census and BEA at the time Then IIIl' IVt\ would bp er-
roneously applied to the company:s. ref?orled book value stocks, and the
result-at a time of rising prices and rlsmg mventOrle,-would be underestimJ_
tion of inventory investment. In other words, fOf given overall bonk values, ii
the LIFO proportion were underestimated, then so would be the total changp
in inventories. However, this effect would tend to be offset to some extent in
the calculation of the constant-dollar change in business inventories. If thp de-
flators for the lifO part (current prices) are higher than those for the FIFO part
(averages of current and earlier pricps), understaternt'nt of the LIFO proportion
would mean that the price indexes used in the calculation are toa low, which
would work in the direction of overestimation ot" inventory investment in con-
stant dollars.
The revised estimates published early in 1976 show that till:' previously pub.
lished IVA figures were actually underestimated during the recession,
moderately in the first three quartprs of 1974 and heavily in the two following
quarters.58 Evidently, errors of the type suggested above were not large and
frequent enough to dominate the outcome.5~
In sum, it is still true that "more than a usual amount of uncertainty sur-
rounds the behavior of real output in the first 3 quarters of 1974.
60 There are al-
ways many opportunities for error in the massive task of deriving the constant-
dollar GNP figures, and the errors are likely to have been much enlarged in this
period of high and variable inflation rates. Although some factors would work
in the opposite direction, a reasonable argument can be made that on balance
some overdeflation occurred. But the error would have to be very large indeed
to produce a rise instead of a decline in real GNP during the first two or three
quarters of 1974.
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According to the current measures, real GNP declined 6.6 percent during the
1973-1975 recession and only 3.2 percent during the 1957-1958 recession.
For industrial production, the difference is much smaller: the index fell
15.3 percent in the last recession, 13.5 percent in 1957-1958. For total civilian
employment there is no difference: employment fell 2.3 percent in both reces-
sions. It is of interest to ask what the implicit price deflator for real GNP would
have to have been, with the same current dollar GNP, to produce a 1973-1975
decline equal to that in 1957-1958. The calculation below provides the
answer (GNP figures are in billions of dollars at annual rates, and percent
changes are from 1973:4 to 1975:1):
Implicit Price GNP in Conslant
Curr.lDol. Deflator (JpD) (1972) Dollm
GNP 1972 -100 Change Level Change
1973:4 $1,355.1 109.0 $'1,242.6









1973:4 1,355.1 10lla U426
1975:1 1,446.2 120.2· +"1OT 1,202.8" -IT
Asterisks indicate the hypothetical figures; the other entries are the actuallv
recorded values. The difference between the calculated five-quarter increas~
in IPO of 10.3 percent and the measured increase of 14.3 percent is perhaps
small enough to be within the range of possible error in the price statistics for a
period suc h as 1973-1975. (Translated into percent increases at annual rates
the figures would be alittle over "11 and 8 percent, respectively"2)
Certain differences in coverage, estimation procedures, etc.. between real
GNP and the index of industrial production (liP) could conceivilbly account for
most or all of the recent discrepancies between the movements of the t\Vo
series. Without a full reconciliiltion, the possibility that there are large syste-
matic errors cannot be entirely discounted, but it must be noted that such er-
rors could occur in either series. Less than half of the large number of individual
monthly series included in liP are physical product figures, and some of these
are based upon shipments or sales rather than output from current production;
nearly 30 percent of the liP components are electric power consumption
series, 17 percent are man-hour series, and 7 percent are combined kilowatt-
hour and man-hour series
bJ All the series are adjusted to reflect output rather
than shipments or input, but the adjustments must perforce be based, as in the
case of many of the GNP series, upon inadequate information. The adjustment
of shipments or sales requires knowledge of inventory change. The adjustment
of power consumption and man-hours requires knowledge of output per
kilowatt-hour or per man-hour. The physical product series combined typically
show larger short-run fluctuations than the electric power and man-hour series
combined. The proportion of the product series is smail and that of the man-
hour series is large in the eqUipment category, which Effectively resisted a de-
cline in the early stages of recession in 1974; this might account for some of
the relative strength of liP during that period. Under the particular conditions
created by the energy crisis, the electric power series might have represented
production less well than at other times. Indeed, the electric power (KWH) es-






13 series with early (1973) downturns 66.3 20.3 13.4
Rseries with late (1974) downturns 21.5 64.7 13.8548
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. I' . to 'ts I1St" rf'vision (in June 1976) liP was not rmlly eqUiDlwe! to re- Flna y, prior r , -' . . .
'1 t' 'mportlnt shift~ in the Lurnpmrlloll of OLJ tput such as the rising teet cer aln I ,. ..
share oj small cars in automobile production (which was very Important in the
period under review), but this deficiency has been largely corrected in the Cur-
rent revised liP data.
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NOTES
1. In addition to Moore (1975, 19771, sel' Okun (1975.1) and othpr r!'ports in Brooking> Pdpm
on Economic Activit)', no. 1 (975) and Cagan (1976, 1977).
2. The method of trend adjustment is ,l<hpted from thatusNI by Mintz 1.1970, 19741. Mintzl's·
timates the trend from the raw (but. whrre nrpdrd, seasonally ,ldjustedl data by a (enterrd
75-month (or 25·quarterl moving ,wer,lge. WI' start with the samp step but derive more sta·
ble and cycle-free trend r,ltes of growth as follows: The averagrs of the r,l\V data are com·
puted for each of the intervals Iph,lSes) brtwel'n the specific turning points in the devla·
tions from the mOVing average, and a threr·point moving an'rage of the resulting phase
averages is taken. The trend is then interpolatpd monthly (or quart!'r1yl hetwern tbl' values
of the three-point moving average. Twelve-month moving av!'rages Me used to eliminate
sharp transitions between the trend segments so obtain!'d. The trend segments in the end
phases are extended by straight-line extlapolation to the beginning and end of the data. De·
viations of the raw data from this trend yield the finaltrend·adjusted series, from which the
set of turning points shown in Table 1 is derived.
3. limitations of space do not permit full documentation of the man}' statrments of fart made
in this paper. Most of the reqUired material can be found in the Commerce Departme~t'5
Business Conditions Diges! (BCD) and the labor Department's Chartbook of Prices, Wages
and Productivity, two monthly reports that cover a large number of cyclical indicators and
other economic time series of current interesl. T'lbles and graphs in this report prOVide
some additional evidence. Some of the developments during the slowdown-recession-
recovery period under discussion are presented in the cyclical comparison charts used in
the next section to place the recent changes in historical perspective.
4. These contractions are evident in both current-dollar aggregates and in the deflated series.
On the other hand, expenditures on !londurable goods continued to expand in rurrent dol·
lars, while declining gently in constant dollars, and expenditures on services rose in both
current and constant dollars.
5. The source of the forecasts is the Business Outlook Survey conducted quartrrly by the
American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research The num·
ber of respondents in the five surveys included in the tabulation varied between 45 and 67;
they included business, academic, and governmrnt economists professionally engaged in
business conditions analysis and forecasting. All figures are at annual rates. The "actual" fig·
urI's are taken from the August 1974 issue of BCD.
6. The major source of data on price expectations of consumers is a representative nat;or.ai
sample (1,500 to 3,500 respondents) regularly surveyed by the Survey Rese.uch (enter at
the University of Michigan. See Sandmo (1970), Juster and Wachtel (1972), luster 09731,
Juster and Taylor (19751, and Wachtel (1977l.
7. The list may not be complete, but all these factors are discussed in the recently mushroom·
ing literature on inflation. To be sure, writers with differenttheoreliral views emphasize dif·
ferent basic and proximate causes of the observed price-level movements. Some stress the
effects of monetary growth rates and !he dynamics of price and wage expectations verSus
realizatIOns, others stress the role of exogenous changes in wages and other costs and ofRecession and Recovery of 1973-1976 549
contractual arrangements in labor and product markets. For some recent reviews and contri-
butions, with many bibliographic references, see Okun (lq75b~ and Gordon \·1976l.
8. In 1973, with tilt' unemployment rate remaining quitp stable near its local peak level of less
than 'j percent, the principal reason for the fall of the index must be seen in the c1imhin
consumer prices, with the unfolding downturn in stock pricps playing a significant bU~
smaller role.
9. Cooper and lawrence (19751. The authors oi this paper and its discussants also consider
exchange-rate uncertainty and price controls as other possible reasons for the commodity
speculation.
10. The ratio of the CPI for food to the CPI for all other items (1967 = 100), which varied nar-
rowly between 0.97 and 1.04 in 1954-1972, rose to 1.13 in 1973. Food prices accounted for
slightly more than half of the rise in the CPI during 1973 Isee Hathaway 1974). The farmers'
share in total personal income increased frorn 2.9 percent to 4.2 percent between Decem-
ber 1972 and December 1973 (by Decernber 1974 it had fallen back to 3 percent).
11. We relegate to an appendix the discussion of a major technical question. namely whether
the errors produced by these adjustments would likely be systematic in the sense of seri-
ously over- or underestimating the size and duration of the broad movements of the econo-
my. Our tentati\'e answer is that there are serious questions or uncertaintips about the mea-
sures, but we have found no firm indications of bias.
12. Much of the strength of investment in producers' durable eqUipment may be attributable to
incentives provided by the accelerated depreciation allowances and the investment tax
credit (both adopted in 1971l. Such incentives have been estimated to have a substantial
long-run stimulating effect on the rate of accumulation of capital in the form of machinery
and equipment (see Jorgenson 19711.
13. Unemployment totals and rates tend to turn upward before business cycle peaks because
employment typically rises slowly in the late stages of expansion, while the labor force
grows at a fairly steady rate. The reduced growth in employment is caused either by de-
mand slowdowns or by supply constraints, or both. (In the initial stages of expansion, em-
ployment often grows slowly as well because of the as yet uncertain outlook and the con-
current rises in the average workweek and labor productivity; hence, unemployment fre-
quently lags at business cycle troughs.) For related reasons, the GNP gap (and other mea-
sures of capacity utilization) also have leads at peaks.
Sma!!er deviations from coinrident timing have been observed for some other indicators
on our list; e.g" the employee-hours series leads at peaks by short intervals, reflecting the
much longer and more systematic lead in the average workweek All such f,lets must be
taken into account in the interpretation of chronologies of the type shown in Table 1.
14. Particularly difficult to interpret are the data for retail trade. Deflated retail sales show a
contraction of 11.8 percent between March 1973 and November ·1974. In contrast, employ-
ment in retail establishments is reported to have increased by 3.3 percent from March 1973
through September 1974. Part of the puzzle seems explained by newly compiled statistics
which show that tne average workweek in retail trade decreased gradually from 33.6 hours
in February 1973 to 32.4 hours in November1974, i.e., by 3.6 percent. Total employee-
hours varied narrowly and irregularly between 12.3 and 12.9million per month in
1973-1974. Thus, greater use was made of part-time workels, but total labor input was not
reduced, despite the apparent decline in the volume of business. As they stand, the figures
imply that productivity (real sales per employee-hour) fell 11.4 percent in 1973-1974, an
extraordinary decline.
15. This tabulation, based on the median forecasts from the ASA-NBER surveys, parallels that
given earlier in the text to illustrate the 1973 predictions. The number of participants in the
surveys covered varied between 49 and 62. The survey forecasts have been presented in
successive issues of Explorations ;n Economic Research, published by NBER. The data for
actual raIl'S are taken from the August 1975 issue of BCD.550
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f n thpw md "tl,,'r dirp( t d,lLl ,,11 antl( ip,lt"d pm ('·I,·v,,1 (h,lIlgh It'll inil!!1 n 16. It appe,HI ror ' . . .., ., I' .
ary ('xpe( tations we're' lornH'd Miapll\'~'l}' In _lh(. ~('n",p 1)1 rt''\pundlog (c> rPl t'nt rhlli,dti(m....
Models of e'pect,ltlom whit h S(,('nl (onmtpnl w,th thp,p d,lt,l \\,prl' d('v('lopf'd by
Cagan 11956), Frpnkel l1975i, and Mus-a 1197';)
17. It is tftle th.lt businels prnductilln and 1f1\'l''<lnlPlll dpl isioll5 .UP b,I'PrJ lllmtly on "n1l(ro"
data, which Ml' mor£' familiar and morp p'"mptly .1v.1IIalJl" to r!(,( 1\I(,n'l1l,lk"rl than th.,
"macro" vMiabh's observpd by the pcollomilt. But p( onomi, .lggrpg.ltp, .w' ball'd on a(.
counting figures compiled at the level of the firm, ,md it is preci,ply th(',p mil rodata th~t.up
subject to v.uio'.\s complications, problp;]]s of interpretation, .1I1d possilJl" d"tlJrtions f~
periodl of ,l(e'e!erating inflation and oth(', unique dilturb.-.;l(pl. (For p'amplp, in additll'n to
the commodity and energy snOltagpI, 1971-1974 witn('<;\pc! IHI( (' and \\agp del ootroll ,lod
increase's in legal minimum wagesJ As indica t£'d bv data [('Villllns, (h,lOges ,n a( rountlng
procedurel, and contempor,lfy accounts, £'v,lluation of tl](' {lIrrent,l,ltp of bUline;s in.
come. price-cost rplations, and i"ventorlps has bppn p,Hti( lila r1v difficult 10 thi'. t'Jrbul"nt
period. 151'1' the ,lppendix for some illu,tratio;ll of til{' d.Jta problplllS Invol\'l'd.f tt IPnns
reasonable to assume that this causpd an imrp.Js(' ill tht' f;('qu{'fl( y and a\'('[,lg(' Ilze of the
information,ll delays ar!d errors The source oj til(' 1,1Iter may li(' in ttw inability of ind,v,du,\b
to distinguish promptly and properly bl'tween til" ablolutl' and rplat,vl' comp'.lfl!'flb (Ii '.In·
.Jnticipated price movemellts. nhis has uepn l'mphaSlzl'd in [('c{'nt work on the' aggregate'
supply theory by Friedman, Phelps, lucas, ilnd othl'rs, se'e Pooll'l976 for a sUf\'ey and refer-
encesJ However, in the present contt'xl, it i, ne,'essary also to consider the die( ts of faulty
adjustments for price changes of sales, inventoril's, arid protits, and tht'confounding of :ran-
sitory and longer movements in these variables.
18. In the 1969-1970 recession, inflation continued at rates th,lI were sufficiently high to pre-
vent the major aggregates in UJrrent dollars fronl declining, for there were only rdatively
mild declines in the measures of re.Jler·onomic activity lin physical or dl'flated v,llup (lnit~1.
In most earlier U.S. recessions, pricps either fell or rose so slowly rompared witIi thr con-
trani&fls in total output and I,lbor input that the real and nO/nin,ll indic,ltors tended to
move together. In the 1973-1975 [ecession, for the first time sinu' 1920. lYrlical downtums
in some of the major current-dollar series appeared with long bgs behind thp downturns in
the 'eal aggregates. As in the 1920-1921 recession, inflation was slrorlg enough to producp
these long lags. but recession was strong er!ough to c.wse the eventual declines in the nom-
inal indicators.
19. Thil is so according to the most 'ecent general revision of the Federal Resprvp Board's index,
completed in lune 1976. Seforp that revision. the mdex had ,1 IH"lK of 127.5 In Novem·
ber 1973 and a secondary high of 125.8 in June 1974. iScl' the Fl'deral Reserw! press rekase
of June 26, 1976, and "Industrial Production-1<)76 ReviSion," Federal Rest'f\'e Bulletin,
June 1976, pp. 470-479.)
20. Even excluding construction, the GNP data show grpater weakness rn 1974 than the induI-
trial production index. Real GNP adjustf'd to be as compMab!e as possible with industrial
production shows a peak in the fourth qlJarter of 1973 ,md dec!ll1es every quarler there-
after, reaching a trough in the first quarter of 1975 {se£' 51H\'{',' 01 Current BUI;m'sl, Octo-
ber 1976, pp.9-10!. .
21. The intentions were reflected more clearly in the (hange rn :nventoflps on h,md a~d on
order than in the change in inventories alone; the former declined quite stNdily and sharply
throughout 1974 and early 1975, whereas the lalter bounc{'d up temporMily in the fourth
quarter of 1974. Outstanding orders C,ln ordinarily b(' adjusted promptly by purchasers
when they consider their inventories excessive.
22. !n this respect, the developments in 1972-197.1 resembled those !11 1956-1957, but the sim-
ilarity Eextends only to the changes in the growth ratl'S in the supply of money and near-
money (selected assets of high liquidity); the growth rates themselves were on the averageRecession and Recovery of 1<)73-1976 551
much higl\('r in 1972-1971 tlMn in 1'l56-1l)~7, a~ Wpr(' til!' gruwth rat{'~ In (urrpnt-doilar
GNP.
23. The fir,t indication of a modl'ratl'ly ,timulating impact on consumer ,,-,ntimpnt of tl\(' pro-
posed tax h'glslatlon was reported in th(· Fpbnwy1975 smvey by the UniVl'fsity of ;\\;chi-
gan Survey Research Center.
24. Tax receipts, based all rate, applied to the rISing nominal levl'ls of irhomes and profits
(which were falling in real termsl, increased sharply dunng the first three quarters of this re-
cession, adding to the EConomy's w(,akncss. During previ'Jus rec('ssions tax payments to
the federal govemment declined morf> promptly. Then, during thl' next three quarters lend-
ing June 1975), federal receipts fell at an acceler,lling ratl', from $299 billion to 5250 billion
or by 16.4 percent 1.111 dollar figures in this note are at annual rates). In thp same period, fed-
eral expenditures rosc Irom $307 billion to $352 b,lIion or by 147 percpnt Ito be compared
With their increases of 13.5 percent in the first thrc'e quarters of 1974~the mild-dl'cline
phase of recession-and of only 4 pern'nt in the last three qu.uters of 1'J73. the slow-
growth phase of expansion!. The fpderal dc·ficit, whi(h (wlipr in 1973-1974 staypd [l'lativl'-
Iy low (between $4 billion and 5B billion) skyrmketpd from 58 billion in 1974: 3 to S102 bil-
lion in 1975'2.
25. The dispersion of specific turning points over timl' has been greater at busine5s (yelc' peaks
than at troughs. For example, the stand,ml devi,1l.ion of leads and lags in 1948-1 '170 \\',15
6.B months at pmks and 5.7 months at troughs for the set of twenty-seven se[lc's includl'd
in the composite indexes of leading, coincident. and lagging indicator, (see BCD. Fpbrl;-
ary 1977, p. 106, fOI a tabulation of the cyclical timing measures for these sef;es).
26. At annual rates, the change in business inventories amounted to about $15 billion in each of
the first three quarters of 1976 and $1.7 billion in thl' fourth quarter; the corresponding fig-
ures in 1972 dollars are approXimately $10 billion and 51 billion.
27. The number of employees on nonagric ultural payrolls (establ;shmen( survey' fell 3per(cnt
from September 1974 to June 1975, then rose 3.8 percent by'lune 1'J76. The number of per-
sons engaged in nonagriculllu,,1 activities (labor fOrle survey) fell 2.3 percentfrom July 1974
to March 1975, then rose 4.1 percent by June 1976. Total civilian employment (labor force
survey) fell 2.4 percent from July 1974 to March 1975, then ;05C 3.9 percent by lune1976.
28. See the corresponding tabulations for 1973 and 1974 predictions in the section on the 1973
slowdown. The membership in the surveys coveted varied betwpl'n 44 and 52. Tnl' data for
actual rates are taken from BCD, "·Iarch 1977.
29. At annual'rates, growth in M.; declined to less than 3 percent in the last quarter of 1975 and
also in the first quarter of 1976, while GNP gained nearly 11 and 13 percl'nt respectively;
hence velocity as measured by GNP/M1 increased about 6-10 percent. I.In the third quarter
of 1975, both M
1 and GNP rosp at much higher rates, but velocity retarded a similar ad-
vance.) Although velocity increased during each of the recent business recoveries, it did 50
at much lower rates. It has been suggested that a decline occurred recentl}' in the volume of
demand deposits that the public desirps to hold at given levels of income and interest rate::;
because certain interest-earning ,lssets (notably savings accounts at commercial banks) call
now be used mare easily for making payments. For some details on the new economic and
legal developments in this area, see Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1976, pp. 191-192.
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33.
See thp qu;uterly turning points in T.lhle 2, lilli'S 22-24. Thl' 1ll(lllt~ly datp, tor thelp'll!ing.
31. ,nincinpn! ann lagging indexes. rpsppcllvl'lv. .lr(': !H'.lk<;--!t111,. IQ! 1. N"'oT·mb,·11971. ,1I)d
October 1974; troughs-Fpbruilfy 1975, M.lrch1975, .lnd April 1'J76.
32. The growth cycle indpxes are baspd 011 (o~.r)()n('nt sprrps PXIHPssc'd as dpv;ations from
trenn; hence, "expansions" and "contractlons hprp rPI',p<;c'nt high-growth and low-growth
h- rn-noctivply. For furthp; dpt"il rpgarding the ((Jnstrucllon of thp fOll1pmitp ,1I1d dii- P <Ises, <.)". . .' .
fusiun innexes used for refNence dating. sep Mintz 11974,1'1'.22-24)
When a historical cumulative niffusion indp~ drrfts npither upw'lrd nor downwarn, it mpans
that about half of the component series arl' expanding .lon halt are contracting.
34. The inclusion in the index of Ihp few current-dollar aggregatps that did contract would not
have changed the date of the downturn. The inc lusion of .111 currpnt-nollar aggrpg.ltf'S
covered wouln have produced an index with .1 double-peak (November 1473 ann Aug-
ust 1974) configuration. But this combination of current-dollar and deflatpd or physical unit
aggregates has little to recommend it when thp romponpnts !Jphave in such divergent
fashion. .' . . . I I \ _ ,
35. Spearman's rank correlation coefflClpnt IS deflllpd as r, = 1 - [6S/,n - n,1. where S= ~d' is
the sum of squared differences between the ranks and p is the number of ranks. The foUmv-
ing excerpt, based on the exact distribution given in (lwpn (1962. p. 401), shows the proba-




4 089 0017 0.034
6 0.83 0.029 0058
8 0.77 0.051 0102
10 0.71 0.068 013&
12 0.66 0088 017&
Approximalely, then, for ranks of six observations Ir,1 must equal or exceed 0.89 to be signii-
icant ilt the 0.05 level. If r, is expected to be positive /i.e., on the one-tailed test), the carre·
sponding value would be 0.83.
These results assume no tied ranks and m.lke 110 correction for continuity (note that any
value of 5must be even). For full explanation, see Kendall (1948l.
36. The corresponding rank correlation for the index of industrial production li.e., the correla-
tion between lines 12 and 17) is virtually zero (r, = -0.11. This is influenced by the short de-
cline in the index in the last recession, but the correlation is low even when this observation
is omitted.
37. To reduce the influence of isolated, outlying values, we use three-month averages centered
on the months of specific turning points covered. All our series, excep! two, conform
positively to business cycles; so the measured changes represent total percent amplitudes
of cyclical declines. The two unemployment series move countercyclically. ip.. rise in busi-
ness recessions; here, rank 1 denotes the smallest rise and rank 6 the largest.
38. This extent of agreement was determined by using coefficients of concordance (\\1, which
are closely related to averages of all Spearman's rank correlation copfficients that can be
computed for a given number of rankings, m; that averagp equals R=(mW - l,/(m - II.
See Kendall (1948, Chap 6).
When the employment series (lines 25-27, 29, 31, and 34) arp ex! luded, IV for the re-
maining complete rankings in Table 6 is 0.74.
39. When the employment series (lines 25-27, 29, 31, and 34) are excluded. IVior the remain-
ing complete rankings in Table 8 is 0.77. These measures are comparable and very similar to
those for Table 6 (see note 3B and accompanying text).Recession and Recovery of 1973-1976 553
40. If th., dfl·,l> of ,trikes Iouki be l'hmlnatl'd. thp dates ot p!'aks and :roughs might welllw al-
fpcwd. as \,/pll as thl' amplitudl's. A fwther Iompiilation i, that som!' strikps,]fp antilipatl'd
and all have aft..rmaths. [Xl Iusion of the strikp month may limit the avprage to \hl' months
strongly affpcted by both thp anticipatory and Lll! hing-up activiti!'s (purlhases. produc-
tion). Npvprthplpss. this adjustment would havp lhangl'd only .1 fl'\\' of thl' Irldivldual rank-
ings in tables 6 and 8 and notthp ovprall rank aVPfages.
41. The diffusion indexes lor pmployment use components 01 BCD series 41-numher of em-
ployees on nonagricultural p.lyroI!S. l'stablishml'nt SurVl'y (Bureau of Labor Statistil'l. The
index based on the finer decomposition (172 ir.dustries) applips to .1 somewhat ll'sS com-
prehensive aggregate than does the 30-industry index. and it COVl'rs only the last three ron-
tral tions. The diffusion index for production uses the 24-industry rompOIll'nts of BCD series
47 - index of industrial production (Board of Covprnors of the Federal Reserve System!. For
e:<amples of diffusion indexl's of leading and lagging indilators see lharts 3. 4. an;l 5 and al-
companying text.
42. Except for the 1929-1q3) p<.'f1od. all business contrartions covered were shorter than
1Bmonths; so their full course plus thp last year of the prelPding and .1 short imtial part of
the following expansion are portrayed in the first sf'! of our graphs. On thl' othpr hand. all
but two of the business expansions cover..d lasted longer than 24 months (the eXI eptions
are the 1921-1923 and 1927-1929 phases. which lasted 22 and 21 monthsl; so graphs in
the second set show for the most part only the re(Overy ,tages of pxpansion plus the last
6 months of the preceding contraction.
43. Total retail sales were used for 1947-1976; department store sales. fm 1919-1946. Depart-
ment stales carry a general line of apparel and furnishings; they handle only to a minor ex-
tent or not at <111 such goods as automobiles. tires and parts. gasolinp and other fuels. and
food. In the period covered by both series (since 1935). thp relative Iydil .11 amplitudes of
current-dollar sales of departml'nt store> were in most instances larger than those of
current-dollar retail sales. This lends additional emphasis to the showing in Chart 6 that the
1973-1975 percent decline i!l real retail sales was larger than the 1929-1931 decline in real
department store sales. However. the lomparison may sufier from unknown errors in th!'
adjustment for p,ice level changes.
44. Since profits after taxes are partly paid out in dividends and partly retained and used to fi-
nance investment imainly in fixed but also in working capital). .1 Iomprehemive pril I' index
seemed to be the most appropriate deflator. We delided to use the GNP implicit price de-
flator The fixed-weight price ind!'x for the gross business product (BCD. 311) might have
been prefe~ablebut is not available prior to 1965.
45. For example. assume that two recessions start from the same peak level. say 100. but one
recession is mild. with a trough at 90. the other severp. with a trough at 50. If now the
recovery produces a five-point rise. to 95 and 55. respectively. the perlent rise. calculated
in th!' usual way. would bp 5.6 percent in the first lase.l0 percent in the second. Rebtive to
the preceding peak le\'el. however. the rates of recovery in the two instances are the same.
and the higher percent increase in the second casp is due to the low base. IIll identally. con-
trary to this example. past patterns of recovery tend to show larger illl reases in real output
when the preceding recession has been spvere tha!l what it has been mild. el'en when mea-
sured relative 10 preceding ppak levels.
46. There have been twelve business expansions since 1921: thp one that started in Octo-
ber 1945. follOWing the eight-month del line connected with the World War II reconversion.
is not included because of the peculiarities of that episode.
47. Consistent results are also obtained for the relation with noniarm employment and with un-
employment. The larger the rise in employment or dpcline in the unemployment rate during
the eighteen months nf d recovery. the larger the rise in the CPI inflation rate. Here r = 0.93554 Victor Zarnowitz and Geoffrey H. Moore
for employment and -0.81 for unemployment for the eight recoveries of 1933-1976 (ex-
cluding 1945). These observations remind one of the recently advanced "accelerationist"
view of the unemployment-inflation relationship. See also Moore (1976).
48. In some cases, such as structures other than Single-family houses, they are indeed nonexis-
tent, and indexes of cost of inputs (material, labor) are used instead as poor substitutes. The
presence of a serious secular upward bias in the official price indexes is suggested in Robert
]. Gordon's forthcoming study for NBER on the measurement of durable goods prices.
49. A comparison of output of capital equipment as measured in the industrial production in-
dex with deflated expenditures on capital equipment as measured in the national income
accounts shows an unusual divergence in 1974-1975, with deflated expenditures beginning
to decline two quarters earlier and beginning to rise one quarter later than output, with a
total decline of 20 percent in expenditures and 13 percent in output. This suggests overde-
flation of expenditures, but does not prove it. See Capital Goods Review (Machinery and
Allied Products Institute), no. 104, October1976.
50. In 1963 the Census Bureau introduced an index of sales prices for Single-family houses,
which was a major improvement, and a further advance was made recently through the
joint development by BEA and Census of new prices indexes for structures. (For details on
the new measures, see "Revised Deflators for New Construction, 1947-63," Survey of Cur-
rent Business, August1974, pp. 18-27.) Still, for most types of construction the deflators
must be based on inadequate input price indexes.•
51. In 1962 a study by the u.s. Bureau of the Budget demonstrated that useful productivity
measures could be developed for many activities of U.s. government organizations. In 1973
the Office of Management and Budget decided that work to measure federal productivity
should continue, as a responsibility of the Bureau of labor Statistics. By 1974, about 1.7 mil-
lion man-years, or 61 percent, of federal civilian government employment were covered by
the output per man-year measures developed for some two hundred organizational units
grouped into sixteen functional areas. Productivity for the to,al measured sample rose at an
average annual rate of 1.6 percent a year during fiscal years 1967-1973. For the 96 annual
changes recorded for the sixteen groups, 66 were increases and 29 decreases in productivi-
ty (1 was unchanged). Mostof the declines occurred in fiscal 1970, 1972, and 1973, with no
apparent relation to the business cycle. See Ardolini and Hohenstein (1974).
52. For example, it is widely believed that in recent years real prices of land and raw materials
increased more than real wag]s. The overall relationship between input and output prices in
construction during 1973-1976 is very hard to assess, partly because of weaknesses in the
available data. To cite just one ambiguous comparison, construction cost indexes (Depart-
ment of Commerce composite) rose somewhat faster than the implicit price deflators for
purchases of residential structures in 1973-1975, but somewhat slower than the deflators
for nonresidential structures.
53. Under the FIFO method, the cost of goods sold (withdrawals from the stock) is computed at
the acquisition cost of those goods that have been in inventory the longest time. The LIFO
method values the withdrawals at cost of the goods that have been in inventory the short-
est time. Thus, the remaining inventory entered on the balance sheet is valued under FIFO at
the cost of the recently acquired items, under LIFO at the cost of the earlier acquired items.
(The valuation of acquisitions is at current purchase price in either method.) Other methods
of inventory accounting yield intermediate results, but they are less important and may be
ignored here. For further explanations, see Rottenberg (1974, pp. 29-33, 58-61) and Shoven
and Bulow (1975).
54. The present estimate of IVA in 1974 is a negative $38.5 billion. (IVA is negative when prices
increase, positive when prices fall.) To appreciate this magnitude, note that before-taxRecession and Recovery of 1973-1976 555
profits of nonfinancial corporations equaled $103.8 billion and undistributed profits and
dividends were each approximately $30.5 billion (less than IVA!). In 1975, IVA declined ab-
solutely to a negative $11.2 billion.
55. At the end of 1973, only about 10 percent of the 2,600 firms listed on the New York and
American stock exchanges were· using LIFO, and nearly one-fifth of those had adopted the
LIFO policy during that year. In 1974 approximately 250 firms were reported as making a full
or partial switch to LIFO (quoted from Shoven and Bulow 1975, p. 588; see their references).
Evidently, FIFO remains the most commonly used inventory accounting method despite the
tax advantages of LIFO in inflationary times. Several reasons for this have been suggested,
mainly that firms wish to avoid showing lower reported earnings or expect that their sales
prices may fall or that they may have to reduce their inventories sharply at relatively fre-
quent intervals.
56. Specifically, there was misjudgment of an unusual timing pattern of changes in farm stocks
during 1973, errors in the adjustments for bias between the monthly and the later (and high-
er) annual data, and a new sample and new seasonal adjustments for retail inventories.
57. Problems of measuring business inventories and their change, always difficult but especially
interesting and challenging in inflationary times, are being systematically examined in a new
NBER study; see Foss, Fromm, and Rottenberg (1976, p. 29l.
58. The following data on IVA, in billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted at annual rates, are



























59. According to the producers of these statistics, programs undertaken in recognition of the
need to update the LIFO proportion and to improve the IVA calculation have worked well.
60. Economic Report of the President, February 1975, p.45 (see the section on "Comparisons
of Output Change," pp.45-47l.
61. For example, what error in the implicit price deflator (IPD) would have been necessary to
shift the peak in real GNP from 1973:4 to 1974:3, assuming that the nominal GNP data were
correct? Reported IPD rose 8.3 percent between the two periods; it would have had to in-
crease less than 5.7 percent to effect the shift. This means that the required "overdeflation"
error would have had to exceed 31 percent of the rate of price level increase as measured
by IPD for the period 1973:4-1974:3.
62. It should be noted that we are here concerned solely with the overall relative amplitudes of
specific cycle contractions in real GNP and ignore the differences in the duration of these
movements. In 1973-1.975, the decline in real GNP lasted five quarters; in 1957-1958, it
lasted two quarters. For the industrial production index, the corresponding durations are
nine months in 1974-1975, and fourteen months in 1957-1958.
63. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Industrial Production 1971 Edition,
Washington, D.C.: November 1972, especially pp.32-37. Corresponding information on
the 1976 revision of liP has not yet been published.
64. See "Industrial Production-1976 Revision," Federal Reserve Bulletin,June 1976, p.471.
Beginning with 1967, separate series are now shown for large and small autos, consumer-
type utility vehicles, and business vehicles.556
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